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I link agency theory and resource dependence theory with an institutional theory 
perspective to identify the antecedents of board structure, and the strategic and 
performance consequences of board structure.  I focus on family ownership and 
business group affiliation as determinants of board structure, which I measure by the 
presence of independent directors and CEO duality.  With respect to growth 
strategies, I focus on growth through new domestic ventures and growth through new 
foreign investments. 
The dissertation has three essays.  Essay one examines the effect of family 
ownership and business group affiliation on board composition.  Essay two builds on 
the first one to investigate the growth strategies of firms.  I examine the individual 
and joint effects of board structure, network centrality through board interlocks and 
ownership structure on firm‘s growth strategies.  In Essay three, I examine the 
performance consequences of board structure, network centrality and ownership 
structure. I also investigate the contingency conditions which make board 
independence less or more valuable for emerging economy firms. 
The empirical analysis is based on a longitudinal sample of 2,689 publicly 
listed Indian firms over a nine year period from 2001-2009.  The sample includes all 
the publicly listed firms that have filed the board information with the leading stock 
exchange in India.  The board level data comprises longitudinal board membership 
information involving more than 20,000 unique directors over nine years (2001-2009).  
I obtain data from three sources – Bombay Stock Exchange (Directors Database), 
Prowess, and Capex to create a longitudinal profile of firms in my sample.   
The empirical analyses largely support my arguments.  With respect to the 
board composition, I find family ownership to be positively related to the presence of 
 viii 
independent directors and CEO duality.  Firms affiliated to a business group have 
more independent board members and are less likely to have CEO duality.  Group 
affiliation also interacts with family ownership such that a high family ownership in 
group affiliated firms leads to a reduced incidence of having independent board 
members and an increased incidence of having CEO duality. 
Regarding the growth strategies, I find that boards that are structured keeping 
in view the resource dependence role are more helpful in pursuing growth strategies.  
I find that firms having more independent board members and CEO duality are more 
likely to pursue growth through new domestic ventures or new foreign investments.  
Moreover, firms that are more central in the network of other firms, based on director 
interlocks, are more likely to pursue growth in domestic as well as international 
markets.  I also find that firms with higher family ownership are more likely to 
pursue growth through international expansion and less likely to pursue growth 
through new domestic ventures.  Further, I find that board independence interacts 
with network centrality and family ownership in affecting a firm‘s growth strategies.  
With respect to the performance consequences of firm level governance, I find 
that family ownership, presence of independent directors and separation of the role of 
CEO from board chair are positively related to firm performance.  Additionally, 
directors also help firms become central in the network of other firms, and firms that 
are more central in a network outperform those that are less central.  Board 










For long, the scholarly research on corporate governance (CG) has attempted to prescribe 
a ―one size fits all‖ model (Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2008; Judge, 2009).  Yet, as is 
evident from several meta-analytic studies, there is no consensus about the efficacy of 
various governance practices for different types of firms (Dalton & Dalton, 2011).  With 
its focus on establishing universal links between different governance mechanisms and 
firm performance, the extant literature mostly ignores how organizations interact with 
their environment, which might lead to variations in the effectiveness of different 
governance mechanisms in different contexts (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 
2008; Hambrick, Werder, & Zajac, 2008).   
Most of the empirical research on corporate governance is limited to applying 
agency theory (Judge, 2009).  With a few exceptions (Choi, Park & Yu, 2007; Dahya, 
Dimitrov & McConnell, 2008), extant literature fails to utilize the richness that a 
multi-theoretic approach and contextual variation can bring to the study of firm 
governance.  The importance of context in shaping a firm‘s structure, strategy and 
performance is well established in strategy research (Hambrick et al., 2008).  In 
particular, research in emerging markets suggests that the theoretical lenses and 
approaches that have been used to analyze firms based in developed markets may have to 
be qualified with contextual contingencies when analyzing emerging market firms 
(Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005).  Consistent with this, several scholars 
have found that emerging market firms experience different types of governance 
problems than developed market firms (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes; 2000; Young, 
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Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008).  As a result, it is often argued that agency 
theory is not the most suitable lens to analyze governance issues in all types of firms, and 
in all contexts.  However, even in the case of research in emerging market firms, the 
focus continues to be on agency problems (Singh & Gaur, 2009). 
An important question that is unanswered in the extant governance literature is, 
―How do firms choose different corporate governance mechanisms, and how do different 
governance mechanisms interact with each other and the external environment in 
affecting a firm‘s strategic choices and performance?‖  Even though board structure and 
its impact on firm level outcomes have received a great deal of attention in the 
governance literature, there is relatively little empirical research on the antecedents of 
board structure (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008).  Likewise, there is a lack of systematic 
evidence on the consequences of board structure for firm strategy and performance in the 
context of emerging economies in general, and Indian firms in particular.  In this 
dissertation I address this issue in the form of three essays using a multi-theoretic 
framework, integrating agency theory and resource dependence theory with institutional 
theory.  First essay examines the effect of family ownership and business group 
affiliation on board structure.  The second essay builds on the first one to investigate the 
link between board structure and risk taking behavior of firms by looking at firms‘ 
growth strategies.  More specifically, I investigate two types of growth strategies – 
growth through international expansion, and growth through new domestic ventures.  In 
the third essay, I link firm governance to firm performance.  More specifically, I 
examine the individual and joint effects of board structure, ownership structure and 
network relationships that board members create on firm performance. 
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I use a multi-theoretic framework to recognize the multiple roles that board 
members are expected to perform and the contextual variance in the importance of these 
roles.  Agency and resource dependence are two dominant frameworks to analyze 
different roles of board members (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  However, recent research 
has shown that not all firms face the same types of agency problems (Dharwadkar et al., 
2000), and not all firms compete based on similar resources (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).  
An important contingency that affects both agency problems and resource considerations 
arises from the institutional context in which firms operate (Peng, Wang & Jinag, 2008; 
Peng & Jiang, 2010).  Using the institutional logic, I analyze the relative importance of 
agency and resource dependence roles as they affect board structure and its relationship 
with firm strategy and performance.  
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The three essays in this dissertation investigate the following three questions: 
1. What are the antecedents of board structure in an emerging economy context? 
2. How does firm governance affect firms‘ growth strategies in an emerging 
economy? 
3. What is the relationship between firm governance and firm performance in an 
emerging economy? 
Figure 1.1 presents the broad overview of the above research questions.  




























Essay 1: Ownership Structure, Group Affiliation and Board Composition 
 
There are conflicting views on what a board should look like.  While some scholars 
argue that board should comprise primarily independent directors for effective 
monitoring of managers, others suggest that monitoring by independent directors is 
not only not needed, but also not effective, and that board should comprise primarily 
insiders (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998).  The theoretical roots of these 
divergent views are in agency theory and resource dependence perspective.  There is 
an increasing convergence towards the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance, which emphasizes on the monitoring function of the board through 
independent members. 
Recent theoretical work has attempted to model an optimal board structure 
taking into account the multiple roles that board members play (Adams & Ferreira, 
2007; Raheja, 2005).  The general consensus in this research is that boards structured 
to take care of the agency problems may not be the most optimal (Adams & Ferreira, 
2007).  Optimal board structure and its effectiveness, even in the monitoring role, 
depend on firm and director characteristics (Raheja, 2005).  Extending this 
theoretical work, I argue that optimal board structure is not only a function of firm 
characteristics, but also the external environment in which a firm is situated.  I argue 
that the monitoring and resource dependence roles of a board vary depending on the 
institutional environment.   
In the case of emerging economy firms, resource dependence role is more 
important than the monitoring role.  However, firms face institutional pressures to 
structure their boards to conform to the agency theory based prescriptions.  Faced 
with these institutional pressures and the need to create a bridge with the external 
environment, firms sometimes undertake ceremonial adoption while structuring their 
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boards.  Consequently, in this essay, I examine two sets of antecedents that have an 
impact on board structure – ownership structure, which represents the internal 
governance context, and business group affiliation, which represents the external 
governance context.   
Essay 2: Corporate Governance, Board Networks and Growth Strategies 
In the first essay, I argued that resource dependence role of a board is more important 
than its monitoring role in the case of emerging economies, and firm structure their 
boards keeping in mind the institutional pressures that give more importance to 
monitoring roles and internal factors that make resource dependence role more 
important.  I build on these arguments to examine how board structure affects firms‘ 
growth strategies.  A board that gives more importance to the monitoring role, 
should limit risky growth strategies, while a board that is constituted keeping in mind 
the resource dependence role, should help firm in its growth initiatives. 
 I examine management‘s risk taking behavior by looking at firms‘ domestic 
and international growth strategies.  Growth strategies entail significant risks and 
resource commitment, which can be mapped to the monitoring and resource 
dependence roles of the boards.  With respect to domestic growth strategies, I 
examine growth through investments in new capital projects.  With respect to 
international growth strategies, I examine growth through new foreign investments.  
Emerging market firms have traditionally operated in international markets primarily 
through exports.  A shift from an international operating strategy based on exports to 
that based on a combination of FDI and exports is a major change in the international 
commitment of a firm (Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007), and involves several risks.  
At the same time, success of such strategies requires huge resources, particularly from 
the top management team and the board (McDougall & Oviatt, 2000).  Thus, an 
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examination of domestic and international growth strategies provides a useful setting 
to test the competing views on the roles of boards, based on agency and resource 
dependence theory.   
Essay 3: Corporate Governance, Board Networks and Firm Performance 
In this essay I investigate the linkage between board structure and firm performance.  
Extant literature provides equivocal findings about the board structure and firm 
performance relationship (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Dalton & 
Dalton, 2011).  For example, Choi, Park and Yu (2007) and Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) find a positive relationship between board independence and firm performance 
for Korean and US firms respectively.  However several others find no relationship 
(Klein, 1998; Mehran, 1995; Yermack, 1996) and even negative relationship between 
(Agrawal & Knowber, 1996; Singh & Gaur, 2009) board independence and firm 
performance.  
There are two ways in which the literature can be advanced to reconcile the 
conflicting predictions based on different theories.  First, we need to acknowledge 
that boards have multiple roles, and that the importance of these roles as well as the 
efficacy of a board in performing these roles, may vary depending on the presence of 
other governance mechanisms, internal resource configurations and external 
environment.  Consequently, we need to structure investigations that explore the 
contingency conditions arising due to internal and external environment.  This is 
particularly important in the case of emerging economies, in which the findings from 
developed economies may not be generalizable.  Second, much of the extant 
literature ignores the mechanism through which board members affect firm 
performance.  The resource dependence role requires that board members create a 
bridge with the external environment.  Board members create these linkages through 
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director interlocks.  However, network literature suggests that not all type of 
networks bring the same benefits.  A detailed analysis of director interlocks can help 
identify the network related mechanisms through which board members benefit firms.   
I advance the literature on the two dimensions discussed above.  I argue that 
board independence and the network relationships have a positive relationship with 
firm performance.  The importance of board independence however diminishes in 
the presence of other governance mechanisms, such as a high family ownership which 
minimizes traditional agency problems.  Further, internal members are more 
beneficial than external members in the resource provisioning role that board 
members accomplish through their ties with the external environment.  
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
I test the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation on Indian firms.  There 
are several reasons why I have selected an Indian context for the empirical validation 
of my arguments.  First, a key argument in this dissertation is that the agency theory 
centric model of corporate governance is not suitable for all the contexts.  I utilize a 
multi-theoretic perspective to argue that boards have multiple roles and the 
importance of these roles depends on the external governance context in which firms 
are embedded.  To test these arguments, we need an empirical context which is 
different from the Western context, where much of the governance research has been 
conducted.  Emerging economies, with their recent experiences with institutional 
transition and evolution of governance standards, present a natural laboratory for 
examining alternate viewpoints on firm governance.  Indian firms have historically 
been exposed to Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, even though the 
governance environment in India, with a prevalence of family firms and business 
groups is quite different from other countries that follow the Anglo-Saxon governance 
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model.  Thus Indian firms provide a good setting to test the arguments presented in 
this dissertation. 
 Second, I want to focus on a single country in my analyses, as there is a wide 
variation in governance practices and governance environments within emerging 
markets. For example, in the case of Chinese firms, there is an active presence and 
direct participation of the central, provincial or local governments (Qian, 2000).  On 
the other hand, there is substantially less participation of government in running 
private businesses in India.  Since government is the one to enforce the governance 
codes, their implementation is likely to be substantially different between China and 
India. Additionally, the governance codes that have been developed in China are 
somewhat different from the governance codes implemented in India.  By focusing 
on a single country, I can control for these country specific variations, which would, 
otherwise, not be possible to control. 
 Third, to test the theoretical arguments presented in this thesis, I need to 
obtain longitudinal data on firm and board characteristics.  While, firm level data can 
be reliably obtained in many emerging markets, obtaining longitudinal data on board 
composition is not easy.  I have been able to obtain reliable board level data for the 
entire sample of publicly listed firms in India for nine years (2001-2009), making 
India a suitable empirical setting.  Last, in recent years, firms from advanced 
economies have shown a great deal of interest in the Indian market and Indian firms.  
Indian firms have also become quite active in the global market 
(Knowledge@Wharton, 2011).  Analyzing the growth strategies of Indian firms, in 
the domestic as well as international markets is important for strategy and 






This dissertation makes several contributions to the extant literature.  First, I advance 
the literature on board of directors by looking at the antecedents of board composition, 
which is largely ignored by the extant literature.  I investigate the antecedents using 
institutional perspective in conjunction with agency and resource dependence theories.  
Using institutional theory, I argue that emerging economy firms structure their boards 
in conformity with the agency logic as a ceremonial adoption of dominant norms 
rather than as an actual embrace of the agency theory based prescriptions.  This is a 
novel perspective on board studies, which can explain why, in spite of strict 
governance laws and standards, corporate scandals are becoming a common thing in 
firms with or without ―good‖ corporate boards.  
This dissertation also advances our understanding of the relationship between 
board structure and firm level outcomes.  By looking at the relationship between 
board structure and a firm‘s risk taking behavior as gauged by its growth strategies, I 
am able to delineate the relative importance of monitoring and resource dependence 
roles of the board.  The examination of a firm‘s internationalization strategy along 
with its governance structure is a novel empirical question with potential to integrate 
the internationalization literature with the governance literature.  Also, I examine the 
network relationships that board members develop and the effect of these network 
relationships on growth strategies and firm performance.  Examination of network 
relationships helps in identifying the mechanisms through which board members 
affect firm strategies and performance. 
For agency theory, this dissertation highlights the nature of agency problems 
faced by firms in emerging economies and how these agency problems affect firm 
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governance.  Recent research shows that many emerging economy firm experience a 
unique principal-principal problem, in addition to a principal-agent problem 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Lemmon & Lins, 2003).  
Much of the research in this stream is limited to exploring the performance 
consequences of ownership structure.  I contribute to this literature by exploring how 
the principal-principal agency conflict affects governance through board of directors.  
Furthermore, I argue and show that a lack of traditional principal-agent conflict makes 
resource dependence role of a board more important in the case of emerging economy 
firms. 
For the business group literature, this dissertation helps to disentangle the 
implications of group affiliation for firm governance through boards.  Much of the 
extant literature on business groups has focused on the performance consequences of 
group affiliation.  I argue that group affiliation is a quasi-governance mechanism, 
arising primarily due to external environmental factors.  My focus on governance in 
group affiliated firms would provide fresh insights into the functioning and logic of 
business groups in emerging economies. 
Empirical Contributions 
This dissertation is situated in the context of an important emerging economy – India.  
Indian context provides a useful laboratory setting to test several theoretical concepts 
advanced in recent studies.  For example, Indian firms, in general, have a high level 
of family involvement, which reduces the likelihood of principal-agent conflict, but 
increases the likelihood of principal-principal conflict.  Also, business groups are 
very much prevalent and thriving in India.  Both these factors make resource 
dependence role of a board, potentially more important than the monitoring role.  
Thus the empirical context of this dissertation provides for the contingencies that are 
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important to test the relative importance of different theoretical predictions.  
The database used in this dissertation is unique and has never been used before.  
I have collected data on each board member of about 2,689 listed firms, which is the 
complete population of firms that have filed information about their board with BSE, 
the leading stock exchange in India.  These firms have about 20,000 unique directors, 
several of whom have memberships in multiple boards.  I have obtained longitudinal 
information on each of these directors and developed a map of board interlocks for 
multiple years.  Governance and board network data of such a large scale for an 
emerging economy is a contribution in itself.  I combined this data with two other 
datasets to obtain firm level information and information on growth initiatives.  Firm 
level information comes from Prowess database of the Center for Monitoring the 
Indian Economy (CMIE), which has information on about 20,000 Indian firms.  I 
obtained information on new domestic ventures from Capex database (CMIE), which 
has information on more than 50,000 new capital projects started by Indian firms.   
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter Two, I provide a review of 
governance theories and empirical studies with a focus on contextual variation in the 
need and efficacy of different governance mechanisms. Chapters Three, Four and 
Five present the three essays of this dissertation. The essay in Chapter Three examines 
the antecedents of board structure. The essay in Chapter Four links a firm‘s 
governance structure to its growth strategies.  The essay in Chapter Five builds on 
previous two essays to link governance structure with firm performance. Chapter Six 






THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS AND EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
In this chapter I define the key constructs used in this dissertation.  As discussed in 
Chapter 1, this dissertation comprises three essays that examine the antecedents of 
board structure and the strategic and performance consequences of firm level 
corporate governance mechanisms such as board composition and ownership structure. 
I argue that boards fulfill several roles, relative importance of which varies depending 
on contextual factors and the presence of other governance mechanisms.  With this 
premise, I examine the impact of ownership structure and governance context on 
board composition.  Further, I argue that the strategic and performance consequences 
of the board are dependent on the network relationships that board members create 
and ownership structure.  I elaborate on each of these constructs below: 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Agency theory happens to be the mainstay for much of the governance research 
(Daily, Dalton & Canella, 2003; Dalton & Dalton, 2011; Judge, 2009).  Since a large 
number of governance studies have appeared in Finance journals, I conducted a 
thorough review of four leading finance journals – Journal of Finance, Review of 
Financial Studies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Financial 
Economics – for the past twelve years (1998-2009).  I identified a total of 21 studies 
that investigated either antecedents or consequences of board structure.  Table 2.1 
presents a summary of these studies.  Seventeen of these studies used agency theory 
as the main theoretical framework; three studies used a combination of agency with 
the advisory role of the board; while one study used political science/social 
connections as the main framework.  I observed a similar trend when I reviewed 
governance literature in main stream management journals.  These reviews clearly 
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suggest that scholars tend to take a very narrow perspective when it comes to 
analyzing corporate governance issues.   
The agency view is based on the idea that in modern corporations, there is a 
separation of ownership (principal) and management (agent), which leads to costs 
associated with resolving conflict between the principals and the agents (Berle & 
Means 1932; Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen & Meckling 1976).  The fundamental premise 
of agency theory is that the managers act out of self-interest, and consequently, do not 
always protect the interests of the shareholders.  Managers‘ self-interest driven 
behaviors increase the costs to the firm, which may include costs of structuring the 
contracts, costs of monitoring and controlling the behavior of the agents, and losses 
incurred due to sub-optimal decisions being taken by the agents.   
These agency problems can be resolved using appropriately designed contracts 
which specify the rights belonging to agents and principals (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  
Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 302) refer to such contracts as ―internal rules of the game 
which specify the rights of each agent in the organization, performance criteria on 
which agents are evaluated and the payoff functions they face.‖  However, 
unforeseen events or circumstances require allocation of residual rights, most of 
which end up with the agents (managers), giving them discretion to allocate funds as 
they choose (Shleifer & Vishny 1997).  The inability or difficulty in writing perfect 
contracts, therefore, leads to increased managerial discretion which encapsulates the 
agency problems.   
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Adams and Ferreira, 
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Theoretical paper 
Tradeoff between a 
board‘s advisory and 
monitoring roles 
Management friendly boards (with less 
independence) may be optimal for board 
performance. 
Boone et al., 2007 
1019 US firms that went public 
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Agency theory and 
firm complexity 
Board size and independence increase as firms grow 
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When applied to the realm of corporate governance, agency theory suggests that 
the governance arrangements should be made so as to minimize the principal-agent 
conflict between the owners and managers.  Once a firm aligns the interests of the 
shareholders and the managers, and puts in place safeguards to monitor the erring 
managers, the firm should function more efficiently, resulting in enhanced financial 
performance.  There are several assumptions in this line of arguments that deserve a 
closer scrutiny.  First, agency based arguments take a rather pessimistic view of human 
behavior (Donaldson, 1995; Ghoshal, 2005), where managers are assumed to be ―ever 
ready to cheat the principals or owners unless constantly controlled in some way‖ 
(Donaldson, 1995: 165).  The self-interested and opportunistic model of managerial 
behavior is however not always true.  As Williamson (1985: 64) himself points out, ―not 
all human agents are continuously or even largely given to opportunism‖.  Consequently, 
analyzing governance mechanisms from a singular focus on agency problems may result 
in erroneous conclusions. 
Second, a focus on agency theory has resulted in scholars adopting a 
rational-closed systems view of organizations.  In the rational systems approach, the 
focus is in designing tools for ―efficient realization of ends‖ and for the ―disciplined 
performance of participants‖ (Scott, 2001: 53).  Organizational goals are pre-specified, 
and actors follow prescribed structural arrangements to achieve organizational goals.  
The rational systems approach has been criticized by scholars due to its heavy emphasis 
on the characteristics of the structure rather than the characteristics of the participants 
(Bennis, 1959), and for not taking into account the larger social, cultural and 
technological contexts in which organizations operate and which have an impact on 
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organizational structure and performance.  
Utilizing agency theory, scholars have proposed two models of corporate 
governance – one for and based on the market economies of the Anglo-American 
countries, and the other for and based on the stakeholder economies such as Germany and 
Japan (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2002; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 
1998).  Although these are prominent governance models, some scholars argue that 
Anglo-American as well as European models of corporate governance, with their strong 
emphasis on agency problems between the owners and managers, do not truly reflect the 
governance arrangement and challenges faced by firms in South-East Asia (Dore, 2000; 
Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002), Latin America (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b), and Eastern 
Europe (Filatotchev, Buck, & Zhukov, 2000).   
Even within the countries that are closer to the Anglo-American or the European 
model of corporate governance, there is no consensus on the efficacy of different 
governance mechanisms.  For example, a majority of the governance reforms 
implemented in different parts of the world after the Enron scandal focused on the 
efficacy of corporate boards, recommending greater board independence as a way to 
enhance the monitoring role of the boards.  With better monitoring by the independent 
board members, firms are expected to do better.  The empirical evidence on the 
relationship between board independence and firm performance is however inconclusive 
(Dalton & Dalton, 2011), with scholars reporting a negative (Boyd, 1995), positive 
(Rechner & Dalton, 1991), as well as no relationship (Daily & Dalton, 1997; Dalton et al., 
1998). In a meta-analysis of 54 studies, Dalton et al. (1999) found no systematic 
relationship between board composition and firm performance. 
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One of the potential reasons for not reaching a consensus about the efficacy of 
different governance mechanisms is inadequate attention to the external context, which 
shapes the governance standards and norms in any society (Dyck & Zingales, 2002; 
Khanna, Kogan, & Palepu, 2006; Singh & Gaur, 2009).  In other words, the governance 
mechanisms that firms adapt are not totally exogenous, firms choose an optimum bundle 
of governance depending on the interests and motivations of important organizational 
actors as well as the demands put forth by the external environment (Hambrick et al., 
2008).  A key premise in this dissertation is that corporate governance standards in a 
country are shaped by the interaction of political, cultural, social, and market forces 
(Hamilton & Biggart, 1988; Khanna, Kogan & Palepu, 2006).  Given the importance of 
external governance context, I first discuss the corporate governance environment in 
India.  I then discuss two important governance mechanisms – board of directors and 
ownership structure, with an emphasis on how contexts shape these governance 
mechanisms. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA 
This section presents an overview of the empirical context of this dissertation.  First I 
elaborate on the nature of Indian economy and the governance model adopted by Indian 
firms.  This is followed by a discussion of the evolution of governance standards in 
India in two distinct time periods – from independence (1947) till 1991, and from 1991 
onwards. 
Indian Economy 
India experienced a robust economic growth after it initiated market liberalization and 
privatization programs in 1991.  India is the 4
th
 largest economy in terms of purchasing 
21 
 
power parity and 11
th
 largest economy in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), with a 
GDP of US$ 1.3 trillion in 2009-10.  It is the third most favorite destination for foreign 
investment after China and US.  According to the Indian Commerce Ministry, inward 
foreign direct investments have increased from US $3.6 billion in 2000 to US $34.6 
billion in 2009.  The Indian economy is on a robust trajectory of growth with stable 
growth rates and increasing foreign exchange reserves.  
The Indian capital markets have also been steadily growing in the past two 
decades.  According to a report by the Asian Development Bank, the Indian equity 
market is ranked third largest equity market in the Asian region behind China and Hong 
Kong, with a market capitalization of approximately US $600 billion.  The Indian equity 
market is also ranked 10
th
 largest in the world.  India has an investor base of over 20 
million shareholders which is the third largest investor base in the world.  There are 
about 9000 companies that are listed on the Indian stock exchanges.  India‘s Bombay 
Stock Exchange (BSE) which is one of the oldest (165 years) stock exchanges in the 
world has second largest number of listed companies in the world after the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE).  BSE has recently been rated as the world‘s best performing 
stock exchange. 
The Governance Model 
Indian corporate governance system can be thought of a combination of two conflicting 
models of corporate governance - the outsider-dominated market based Anglo-Saxon 
model followed in US and UK, and the insider-dominated bank-based model followed in 
Japan and Germany.  In India family firms and corporate groups dominate the business 
landscape.  About a third of publicly listed Indian firms are family promoted and 
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managed (Topalova, 2004).  These firms belong to big conglomerates also known as 
business groups.  This is evident from the fact that of the 500 most valuable Indian 
companies, which account for 90% of the market capitalization of BSE, nearly 60% 
belong to business groups.  The ownership in Indian firms is concentrated and the 
finance needed for business activities is mostly provided by the financial institutions.  
According to Topalova (2004), in 2002 the controlling families held as high as 48.1% 
shareholdings in all Indian companies.   
Indian corporate environment is also characterized by pyramidal ownership 
structures, resource sharing among group affiliated companies, weak intellectual property 
protection and poor implementation of the corporate governance laws.  Due to the 
legacy of the British rule, the legal system in India follows the English common law.  
On paper, India has one of the best corporate governance laws that aim to provide great 
protection to shareholders.  However the enforcement of these laws and regulations is 
relatively weak.  A case in point is Satyam Corporation, which was one of the top three 
information technology companies in India in 2008.  Satyam won the Golden Peacock 
Award for the best governed company in the world in 2008.  Within a month of winning 
this award, it was discovered that Satyam was involved in one of the biggest scandals in 
the corporate history of India (Gaur & Kohli, 2011). 
Widespread corruption also plagues the corporate environment. According to the 
Corruption Perception Index 2010 published by Transparency International (TI), India 
ranks 87
th 
(lower score implies more corruption) among 178 countries surveyed with a 
score of 3.3 out of 10.  These corruption ratings indicate how business people and 
country analysts perceive the extent of corruption in a country.  In addition, according to 
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the 2010 Global Corruption Barometer (also published by Transparency International) 
which focuses on small scale bribery, India is among the countries topping the list for 
most number of bribery incidences in the year 2010. 
Corporate Governance prior to Liberalization (1991)  
After gaining independence from British rule in 1947, Indian government pursued 
socialist policies.  At independence India was one of the poorest nations in the world.  
However, it was endowed with a modestly functioning industrial sector, and four stock 
markets with well-defined rules of listing and trading for companies (Goswami, 2002; 
Chakrabarti, Megginson & Yadav, 2010).  Some of these stock markets predated the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange.  India also had a banking system in place to facilitate lending 
and had well developed credit recovery procedures (Goswami, 2002).  
After independence, India, influenced by socialist policies, decided to have a 
planned economy where every aspect of the economy was controlled by the government.  
The government embraced protectionism, state intervention, restrictive regulations and 
central planning as its policies.  The Indian government passed the Industries Act in 
1951 followed by the Industrial Policy Resolution in 1956 also known as the Companies 
Act.  These acts contained provisions that conferred a variety of powers to central 
government over companies.  This put in place a regime of License Raj wherein license 
to production was given to selected few companies.  Private companies had to satisfy 
around 80 government agencies to get a license to produce something, with the 
production still regulated by the government.  This culture of elaborate licenses and 
accompanying red tape that were required to start a business in India bred corruption and 
nepotism, adversely affecting the growth of the Indian economy.  Over the following 
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decades the situation worsened and the Indian corporate sector became plagued with 
pervasive corruption and inefficiency.  
In 1950s the Indian capital market was still in its infancy.  The stock markets 
were inept at catering to the ever increasing demand for new capital by private sector 
companies.  Due to the inadequacy of the stock markets to raise equity capital, the 
government nationalized banks.  The government also established development finance 
institutions (DFIs) to meet the long term financial requirements of the industrial sector.  
Private lenders of equity were often very wary about providing finance to private 
companies as they faced great difficulty in exercising oversight over managers.  This 
problem was made more acute by long delays in judicial proceedings and enforcement of 
bankruptcy claims (Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, 2008).  Thus public banks, 
DFIs together with state financial corporations became the principal providers of medium 
and long term credit and other facilities to companies for the development of the 
neophyte Indian industry.  
These financial institutions often owned large number of shares of the companies 
they lent to and also had nominee directors on their boards.  Since these DFIs were 
owned by the government, all the decisions were driven by their political bosses.  The 
performance of these financial institutions was assessed on the basis of quantity of the 
capital invested rather than on its quality and the interest earned.  These institutional 
stakeholders thus had little incentive to follow effective credit appraisal procedures and to 
monitor the firms they invested in.  The nominee directors of these institutional 
stakeholders merely acted as the rubber stamps in the hands of company‘s management 
(Goswami, 2002; Chakrabarti et al., 2010).  
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Historically, majority of the private firms in India were owned by family 
businesses and corporate groups and were often promoted and managed by a small group 
of members of the controlling families.  The controlling families and corporate groups, 
by virtue of being dominant shareholders, were able to appoint or replace the entire board 
of directors.  Because of the active family involvement in both strategic and managerial 
roles, boards have traditionally acted as rubber stamps of the management.  While the 
role of the board is limited in owner-managed firms, the business group structure 
provided some unique corporate governance challenges.  The interlocking and 
pyramiding of control within a business group made it easy for controlling shareholders 
and promoters to share company profits or funds with other companies of the group.  
The expropriation took place in different ways such as the owner-managers or controlling 
shareholders stealing profits, transfer pricing, asset stripping, diverting corporate 
opportunities from the firm, inducting family members in key managerial positions etc. 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000).  The opaque structure of 
business groups made it difficult to assess the true nature of the business activities within 
individual firms. 
In the pre-liberalization era, the Indian equity market itself was in infancy and 
was not sophisticated enough to exert effective control over companies through market 
forces. Although there were well defined rules for listing and trading on stock markets, 
the enforcement mechanisms were weak and thus non-complying firms were rarely 
punished.  The interests of creditors and minority shareholders thus remained 
unprotected in the absence of stronger regulations and effective enforcement 
mechanisms.     
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Corporate Governance post Liberalization (1991) 
In 1991, India faced a severe fiscal crisis that prompted it to undertake major economic 
reforms which paved the way for deregulation and privatization.  A number of factors, 
such as corporate scandals in early 1990‘s, the need for capital and pressure from 
globalization lead to reforms in corporate governance (CG). 
The CG reforms started with the establishment of a board by the name of the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) under the SEBI act in 1992.  SEBI is an 
autonomous body similar to the US market regulatory body, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).  SEBI was established primarily to regulate the trading of stocks, to 
protect the rights of small investors and to improve the quality of the financial markets in 
India.  Over the years, SEBI has introduced several stock market reforms and has 
significantly helped in improving the functioning of Indian stock markets.  
Following economic liberalization, it became imperative to initialize stock market 
reforms to enable Indian markets to attract investments from foreign institutional 
investors.  The first initiative to improve CG practices was undertaken by Confederation 
of Indian Industry (CII) which is an association of major Indian firms.  A committee 
comprising prominent industrialists submitted the CII Code for Desirable Corporate 
Governance in 1998.  The CII code aimed at providing better protection to small 
investors and promoting transparency within businesses.  The adoption of CII code was 
voluntary, hence only a few companies endorsed it.  The CII code was modeled on the 
Cadbury committee report which was published in the UK in 1992.  SEBI has also 
constituted several committees over the years to further strengthen the corporate 
governance practices in India.  SEBI constituted the first committee in 1998.  The 
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recommendations of this committee were implemented through the enactment of Clause 
49 of the listing agreement between listed companies and the stock exchanges.   
Main provisions of Clause 49 were concerned with issues pertaining to the 
composition of board of directors, giving greater power to independent directors, the 
composition and functioning of the audit committee, CEO/CFO certification of financial 
statements, statement of compliance with the CG norms in annual reports and disclosures 
regarding financial and other matters by the company (Chakrabarti et al., 2007).  The 
key area of focus in Clause 49 is the composition of board of directors in publicly listed 
companies.  It mandates that boards of listed companies should have an optimum mix of 
executive and non-executive directors such that at least 50% of the directors of a firm 
should be non-executive.  It defines an ―independent director‖ and stipulates that if the 
chairman is a non-executive director then at least a third of a firm‘s board of directors 
should be independent and if the chairman is an executive director then at least half of the 
directors should be independent.  It also puts restrictions on the maximum number of 
other directorships and chairmanships a board of director can hold, and lays down rules 
for the minimum number of board meetings to be held in a year. 
According to Clause 49 all listed companies must have audit committees. They 
should comprise at least three directors, two-thirds of these directors should be 
independent and the committee chair should be independent (Varottil, 2010).  At least 
one committee member must have financial and accounting knowledge.  The roles and 
responsibilities of the audit committee are also defined in detail.  Clause 49 also 
mandates all the listed companies to periodically disclose information regarding related 
party transactions, accounting treatment, risk management procedures, subsidiary 
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management where firm has majority shareholding, remuneration of directors, proceeds 
from issued shares and general business conditions such as opportunities, threats, 
financial and managerial developments (Chakrabarti et al., 2007).  These disclosures are 
aimed at ensuring transparency and fair dealing.  Clause 49 also describes the 
composition and functions of the remuneration committee.   
Clause 49 stipulates that CEO and CFO of listed companies must sign company‘s 
financial statements and disclosures and take responsibility for maintaining effective 
internal controls.  Firms are also required by law to include a detailed status report in 
their annual reports, stating their compliance with corporate governance norms.  Every 
firm should submit a compliance report to the stock exchange where it is listed on a 
quarterly basis.  Firms also need to send half-yearly financial results and other important 
event reports to their major shareholders.  In essence Clause 49 provisions are quite a lot 
similar to those of Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US.  Clause 49 rules were implemented in 
a phased manner over several years, first to the largest firms, then to mid-sized firms and 
later to the publicly listed small firms.  There were penalties for non-compliance, 
including potential de-listing from stock exchanges.   
In the wake of several corporate and accounting scandals including those 
affecting Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International and Adelphia at the turn of the 21
st
 
century, a more stringent corporate governance legislation named the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act was enacted in the US in 2002.  These scandals shook the corporate governance 
regimes worldwide. SEBI also felt the need to strengthen the corporate governance 
regulations in India. SEBI constituted a second committee to review and further improve 
the existing corporate governance norms.  This committee, chaired by Narayana Murthy, 
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submitted its recommendations in 2003 and further refined the rules laid down by Clause 
49.  
The provisions of the revised Clause 49 were implemented to all the listed firms 
with paid up capital of Rs. 30 million and with a net worth of Rs. 250 million or more at 
any time since their inception.  The revised Clause 49 enhanced the standards of 
corporate governance for all publicly listed firms primarily by broadening the 
responsibilities of the board of directors, strengthening the role of the audit committee 
and making the management more accountable for all company affairs.  The SEBI 
committees‘ recommendations and their implementation in the form of various clauses 
have played a pivotal role in improving the corporate governance practices in India. 
However, by the end of 2009, several firms did not totally comply with the regulations 
(Khanna & Dharmapala, 2008).  Several others complied with the regulations but did 
not endorse the spirit behind the regulations.  For example, many firms appointed family 
members, who were not company executives, on boards.   
There are still problems in the corporate governance structure of Indian firms. The 
regulations, in their present form are still incapable of preventing financial scandals such 
as the Satyam one.  Although Satyam was subject to the provisions of Clause 49, the 
regulations still could not prevent Satyam from being involved in one of the biggest 
corporate scandals in the Indian corporate history.  In spite of severe penalties for 
non-compliance, the level of compliance remains relatively low (Khanna & Dharmapala, 
2008).  There is no provision for firms to compulsorily have a nomination committee 
which can help in protecting the interests of minority shareholders.  Due to the absence 
of a nomination committee, the majority shareholders are able to appoint such individuals 
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as independent directors who will sympathize with the perspectives of the controlling 
shareholders and will have complete allegiance towards them (Varottil, 2010).  Table 
2.2 presents a summary of institutional and governance specific reforms in India post 
1991. 
TABLE 2.2: Institutional and Governance Reforms in India  
 
General Economic Reforms 
Time Line Key Reforms 
1991  Fiscal crisis – Foreign exchange sufficient to support just two weeks of 
imports 
 Pressure from IMF to start liberalization as a pre-condition to loans 
 Realization on part of policy makers of the importance of liberalization 
 Government initiated a limited liberalization initiative 
 Reserve Bank of India (RBI) devalued the Indian rupee by 20% 
 Delicensing 
 Number of industries reserved for public sector reduced from 17 to 8 
 Licensing system abolished except in 15 critical industries 
 Eliminated the requirement of government‘s approval for expansion of 
large firms  
 Foreign firms allowed to hold majority ownership in JVs 
 Automatic approval for foreign investment up to 51% in 35 industries 
 100% ownership shares and full repatriation of profits in many industries 
for investments by NRIs 
1992  Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) given permission to invest in all 
securities traded on the primary and secondary markets with certain 
restrictions 
 Restrictions on the use of foreign loans abolished 
 Foreign portfolio investors allowed to invest in listed companies 
1994 Indian rupee made fully convertible on current account 
1996 100% debt FIIs permitted, FIIs could buy corporate bonds, but not government 
bonds 
1997 The maximum ownership limit of 24% for all FIIs in a firm raised to 30. 
1998 Further reforms in investment policies 
 Upper limit of ownership by one FII in one firm raised from 5% to 10% 
 FIIs allowed to operate in forward markets on a limited basis 
 FIIs allowed to trade equity derivatives 
1999 Requirement of having at least 50 investors for FIIs eased to 20 investors. 
2000 
onwards 
 Further liberalization in the investment regime. 




Corporate Governance Specific Reforms 
Time Line Key Reforms 
1992  Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) act passed by the parliament. 
 SEBI instituted as an independent regulator. 
 Over the years, SEBI instituted four committees (in 1996, 1998, 2000 and 
2002) for CG reforms.  
1994  Government efforts to reform Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), the major 
stock exchange in India met with stiff resistance. Government instituted a 
new stock exchange, National Stock Exchange (NSE), as a competitor to 
BSE, establishing better practices and more standard corporate governance 
(BSE was an association of Brokers). Over time, this resulted in reforms in 
the BSE as well. 
2003  SEBI made as a single window approver for FIIs (earlier they had to seek 
approval from the federal bank also) 
Source: Singh and Gaur (2009) 
 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Different Roles of a Board 
Board members fulfill a multitude of roles (Brennan, 2006; Stiles, 2001).  In a survey of 
board members, Korn/Ferry (1999) found that board members, even in Anglo-Saxon 
governance environments, do not consider monitoring to be their only role.  Based on 
the findings of this survey, and underlying theoretical rationale, Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) group board roles in two broad categories – control and monitoring roles based on 
the agency theory and resource provision, service and strategy roles based on the resource 
dependence theory.  Zahra and Pearce (1989) further suggest that strategy and service 
functionalities of a board are different within the resource dependence role.  
 Monitoring and control function of a board is concerned with protecting the 
interests of the shareholders. Under this role, directors assume the responsibility of 
setting the risk appetite of the organization, hiring and firing of the CEO, monitoring and 
controlling the managers, and ensuring compliance with statutory and other regulations.  
Theoretically, the control function can be viewed from managerial hegemony approach or 
32 
 
board hegemony approach (Huse, 1990; Kosnik, 1987).  The managerial hegemony 
approach takes a negative view on the role of boards, assuming boards to be formal 
institutions with very limited authority (Herman, 1981; Pfeffer, 1972).  According to 
this view, boards mainly operate as rubber stamps to validate the actions of the firm 
management, and do not have authority or motivation to monitor the management.  The 
board hegemony approach, on the other hand, takes a positive view on the role of board.  
Deriving from agency theory, the board hegemony view assumes boards to protect the 
interests of shareholders by monitoring and controlling firm managers (Beatty & Zajac, 
1994; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  In order to effectively perform the monitoring role, 
boards should have more independent directors, who are not influenced by the firm 
management and if needed, can take a stand against the management. 
 Under the strategy role, board members are expected to be involved in framing 
the mission and vision of the organization, setting up the corporate culture at the very top 
of the organization and working with the top management team in formulating 
organizational strategy.  Stewardship theory considers a board‘s role to be mainly 
strategic, in helping managers achieve shared goals.  According to stewardship theory, 
agents are essentially trustworthy and good stewards of the resources entrusted to them, 
which makes monitoring redundant (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997; Donaldson 
1990, Donaldson & Davis 1991, Donaldson & Davis 1994,).  Furthermore, in addition 
to economic considerations, agents‘ decisions are influenced by non-economic 
considerations, such as the need for achievement and recognition and intrinsic 
satisfaction from successful performance (Muth & Donaldson 1998).   
 Davis et al. (1997) suggest that managers identify with their organizations, 
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which leads to personalization of success or failure of the organization.  As a result, 
managers function in a manner that maximizes financial performance, including 
shareholder returns, as firm performance directly impacts perception about managers‘ 
individual performance (Daily, Dalton & Canella 2003).  Supporting this view, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) suggested that managers, who bring good financial returns to 
investors, establish a good reputation that allows them to re-enter the financial markets 
for the future needs of the firm.  Consequently, managers should be given autonomy 
based on trust, which minimizes the cost of monitoring and controlling the behavior of 
managers and directors.   
With limited requirement for monitoring and control, firms can structure their 
boards to maximize the benefits under strategy role.  Thus, as per the stewardship theory, 
the value derived from a board can be maximized by having a majority of inside directors 
on the board.  Inside directors have a better understanding of the business, and are better 
placed to govern than outside directors, and therefore make superior decisions 
(Donaldson 1990, Donaldson & Davis 1991).  Likewise, CEO duality (i.e., same person 
holding the position of Chair and the chief executive) is viewed favorably as it leads to 
better firm performance due to clear and unified leadership (Donaldson & Davis 1991, 
Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997).   
 Another set of activities, under the service role of a board, involve enhancing the 
reputation of the firm, establishing linkages with external bodies and other firms, working 
as brand ambassadors for the firm, and assisting firm in acquiring resources from the 
external environment (Boyd, 1990; Brennan, 2006; Gales & Kesner, 1994; Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  The theoretical 
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explanations for resource role of a board come from the resource dependence perspective. 
According to resource dependence theory, organizations attempt to exert control over 
their environment by co-opting the resources needed to survive (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978).  
Accordingly, this perspective views governance structure and the board composition as a 
resource that can add value to the firm (Hillman, Canella & Paetzold 2000; Johnson, 
Daily & Ellstrand 1996).  Boards are considered as a link between the firm and the 
essential resources that a firm needs from the external environment (Carpenter & 
Westphal 2001).  Board members also function as boundary spanners, and thereby 
enhance the prospects of a firm‘s business.  For example, the outside links and networks 
that board members create may positively benefit the business development and 
long-term prospects for a firm (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978).   
Governance Context and the Relative Importance of Board Roles 
There is no consensus on what roles the board members should perform. I argue that 
different roles of a board are not always in conflict with each other; however, their 
relative importance varies depending on the external governance context and presence of 
other governance mechanisms.   
As discussed in the previous section, there are two main models of corporate 
governance – the Anglo-American model and the European model.  The 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance is characterized by dispersed ownership, 
less aggressive private shareholders, equity based financing, powerful CEO and executive 
directors, and relatively higher emphasis on shareholders as against stakeholders 
(Anguilera & Jackson, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  Presence of dispersed 
ownership and less aggressive shareholders provides conducive opportunities for 
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managers to indulge in self-serving behavior, leading to agency conflict between the 
shareholders and the managers.  As a result, the statutory bodies in countries that follow 
Anglo-American model, emphasize that boards concern themselves with protecting the 
interest of the shareholders.  The American law Institute (1994), in its definition of 
conduct of companies, emphasizes that business should be conducted to enhance profits 
and shareholder gain, with due consideration given to ethical and charitable issues.  
Clearly, in countries that follow the Anglo-American model, the monitoring and control 
function of the board is important. 
 The European model of corporate governance is characterized by concentrated 
ownership, very active institutional shareholders, particularly banks, debt financing, 
relatively higher level of board independence and relatively higher influence of different 
stakeholders, in addition to the shareholders (Anguilera & Jackson, 2003; Becht & Roell, 
1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  In many countries that follow 
this model, the role of board is not clearly specified in law (Dennis & McConnell, 2003).  
Given the emphasis on multiple stakeholders, protection of shareholders is not the 
primary goal of the board (Dennis & McConnell, 2003).  In some countries (e.g. 
Germany) firms adopt two layered board structure, in which the internal layer is 
concerned with protecting the interests of lenders and institutional investors, while the 
external layer is concerned with protecting the interests of different stakeholders.   
 The dichotomous governance models discussed above do not truly reflect the 
governance arrangements found in many emerging markets such as India.  Firms in 
emerging markets are often relatively small (Gaur & Kumar, 2010), with significant 
involvement of members of the founding family.  In such cases, the resource 
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provisioning role of the board is often more important than the monitoring and control 
role for several reasons.   First, emerging economy firms are characterized with 
ownership concentration and high level of family involvement, which reduces the 
likelihood of principal-agent conflict (Carney, 2005; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & 
Buchholtz, 2001).  In the cases when owners also act as managers, the owner-manager 
interests are naturally aligned, minimizing the chances of a traditional principal-agent 
conflict (Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  In addition, property rights are largely restricted to 
internal decision agents, giving them a right on the residual claims (Schulze, Lubatkin & 
Dino, 2002).  Second, family involvement means that the owners inherit some property 
from their elders, and have an obligation to leave something for their heirs (Carney, 
2005).  As such, it becomes a ―responsibility‖ of owner-managers to see to it that the 
firm pursues strategies that are most suitable for the long term survival and performance 
of the firm.  Thus, firms in emerging markets such as India face substantially less 
agency problems as compared to their counterparts in countries with Anglo-American 
governance environment.  Given the reduced incidence of conflict between owners and 
managers, the monitoring role of the board becomes less important.   
Third, firms in emerging economies face resource scarcity as capital markets, 
labor markets and products markets are relatively less developed (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000a; Chacar & Vissa, 2005).  In a less munificent environment, firms need more 
linkages with the external environment (Boyd, 1990), making the resource provision role 
of the board more important.  Finally, there is a wide-spread presence of network type 
of organizational forms such as business groups in emerging markets.  Business groups 
are a set of legally independent entities, with formal and informal linkages, and 
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operations in multiple product markets.  While not all emerging market firms are 
affiliated to business groups, the network relationships have become embedded in 
organizational genes in emerging economy firms (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001).  
Consequently, firms structure their boards with an emphasis on the resource dependence 
role to maximize their linkages with the external environment.   
 The contextual variation in the importance of different board roles is reflected in 
how firms structure their boards and how boards influence the strategies and performance 
of firms.  I discuss these aspects in the following sections. 
Board Antecedents 
Given the multiple roles that board members perform, board composition is likely to vary 
depending on the relative importance of a particular role for a firm.  With this premise, 
some scholars have examined the antecedents of board composition.  There are three 
broad set of factors that scholars have advanced as antecedents of board structure.  First, 
the external governance environment determines the relative importance of different roles 
that boards fulfill, and thus affects the board structure.  It is well established that the 
structure of corporate governance varies a great deal across countries (Jenkinson & 
Mayer, 1992; La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  These variations arise 
due to differences in the national cultures, and institutional norms and assumptions about 
the role and importance of different stakeholders in the functioning of an organization 
(Dyck & Zingales, 2002; Hamilton & Biggart, 1988; Khanna, Kogan, & Palepu, 2006). 
While several scholars suggest that the variations in the external governance environment 
should affect the board composition, I could find only one empirical study in this domain.  
Li and Harrison (2008) link four dimensions of national cultural environment (Hofstede, 
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1980) to board composition and leadership structure in a firm.   
 The second factor that affects board composition is the ownership structure.  
Jenkinson and Mayer (1992) suggest the prevalence of two broad categories of ownership 
structures in developed country firms.  One category includes firms in the US and the 
UK, where ownership is dispersed among a large number of individual and institutional 
investors.  In this case, the responsibility of protecting the interests of the shareholders is 
put on the legal system, which sets forth the rules and regulations for board composition 
to oversee the firms.  The second category of firms includes those found in Japan and 
continental Europe, where ownership is concentrated in a small number of related firms 
and banks.  Because of concentrated ownership, these groups of owners are themselves 
responsible to protect their interests and do so by actively monitoring the firm operations.  
There is also a third category, which includes firms found in many emerging markets, 
where a single family is often a dominant owner controlling a number of firms though 
pyramidal ownership structure and business group affiliation (Carney, 2005; Schulze at 
al., 2001).    
 The third factor that affects board composition includes firm specific 
characteristics.  Firms differ in the level of internal complexity and the need for 
monitoring by external agents as well as for resources from the external environment.   
In a theoretical piece, Raheja (2005) argues that even when the primary role of the board 
is monitoring and control, there is a cross sectional variation in the size and composition 
of the board, depending on firm characteristics.  Raheja (2005) suggests that in 
technology intensive firms, insiders are well aligned with the CEO and provide limited 
effectiveness in the monitoring role, whereas in diversified conglomerates, insiders have 
39 
 
high incentives to provide useful information to the external members and thereby help in 
the monitoring and control role. 
 These factors also interact with each other in affecting board composition.  I 
further discuss the nuances of board antecedents in Chapter 3. 
Board Members and Network Relationships 
Given the different roles that board members perform, it is not surprising that there is 
little consensus on the strategic and performance consequences of board composition.  
Some scholars have argued that the original conception of board of directors was not to 
enhance shareholder value or firm performance, but simply to protect shareholder 
investments (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Tricker, 1984).  However, to the extent that 
board members control agency problems, or help in strategic and resource acquisition 
roles, they should affect the strategic choices firms make as well as the performance of a 
firm. 
 Earlier in this chapter, I have argued that resource dependence role of board 
members is more important in emerging markets.  The resource dependence role, can 
however, be effectively realized if board members help develop linkages with the 
external environment (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Gulati, 1998; Gulati & Westphal, 
1999).  Development of linkages with the external environment is facilitated by 
simultaneous presence of board members in multiple organizations.  For example, if two 
firms have potential to develop a buyer-supplier relationship, such exchange is facilitated 
by the presence of a common member on the boards of the two firms.  
Not all linkages are however, equally important (Gulati, Dialdin & Wang, 2002).  
Network literature suggests that inter-linkages in a network are important only if they 
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help the firm become central to the network.  To further elaborate this point, consider 
three firms, A, B and C in a network of many firms.  Firm A‘s directors are unique to it, 
i.e. they do not sit on the boards of any other firms.  All the directors of Firm B sit on 
the board of another firm, creating a strong relationship between Firm B and the other 
firm.  In the case of Firm C, all of its directors sit on the boards of different firms, 
creating relationships with multiple firms, albeit not as strong as in the case of Firm B.  
Since Firm C has more relationships, it is more central in the network and is likely to 
derive greater benefits from its position in the network (Freeman, 1979).  I discuss the 
strategic and performance consequences of network relationships in Chapters 4 and 5.  
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Ownership structure is another important governance mechanism.  There is a rich 
literature linking the ownership structure of a firm with different firm level outcomes 
such as diversification (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990, Montgomery, 1994; Ramaswami, Li, & 
Veliyath, 2002), and firm performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Thomsen & Pedersen, 
2000).  Agency theory has been the dominant theoretical framework linking ownership 
structure to firm level outcomes.  A general prediction in this literature is that 
concentrated ownership helps in monitoring the managers and controlling their 
self-serving activities such as diversification.   
 More recently, some scholars have argued that the effect of ownership 
concentration also depends on the type of the owner (Douma, Geroge & Kabir, 2006; 
Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003).  In this line of research, scholars have 
differentiated between domestic owners and foreign owners (Douma et al, 2006), 
different types of institutional owners such as pension funds, mutual funds, banks and 
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other financial institutions (Johnson & Greening, 2002).  As I discussed previously, a 
differentiating feature of emerging market firms, such as those found in India, is a high 
level of family ownership, and presence of business groups.  In the next section, I 
discuss the strategic and performance consequences of these two governance factors. 
Family Ownership 
Family firms have long been a part of the economic system in any country, although their 
relative importance for the local economy varies.  In particular, there is very limited 
research in main stream management and economic journals on family firms (Schulze et 
al., 2001).  The limited available literature mostly focuses on agency related 
consequences of family ownership (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  There is very little 
theoretical or empirical evidence suggesting how family ownership affects strategy and 
performance of firms.  A general view is that concentrated ownership in the hands of a 
family and involvement of controlling family members in running the firm eliminates the 
need to monitor or control the managers, minimizing the traditional agency problems.  
At the same time, family ownership exposes firms to different types of agency problems, 
in which the owners themselves indulge in opportunistic behavior, often at the expense of 
minority shareholders (Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  In this section, I discuss the 
disadvantages and advantages of family ownership and its consequence for corporate 
governance of family-owned firms. 
 The disadvantages of family ownership are primarily attributed to the problem of 
self-control and altruism in family firms (Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison, & Myers, 1960; 
Schulze et al., 2001).  Altruism refers to a trait that links one‘s personal well-being to 
the well-being of others (Becker, 1981; Bergstrom, 1995).  Altruism distorts the 
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incentive structure in a family (Fukuyama, 1995).  The head of the family takes all the 
resources and distributes them to all the family members, often regardless of their 
capabilities or contributions (Simon, 1993).  This creates a disincentive for family 
members to ―work, save and invest‖, leading to a situation where at least some members 
free ride on the efforts of others (Kerr et al., 1960: 94).  
 Altruism also leads to the problem of self-control for the owner of the family 
firm.  The owner-manager in a family firm may make decisions that serve the interests 
of the family, and not necessarily the firm (Schulze et al., 2001).  Such decisions include 
appointing less competent internal agents in leadership positions, starting a new venture 
as a learning tool for the future heir of the family and over indulgence in philanthropic 
activities.  There is limited recourse available against the problem of self-control.  In 
fact, the owner-managers may resist instituting best practices in the fear of losing their 
perquisites and control over firm affairs.  Owners in family firms may also expropriate 
the firm value at the expense of minority shareholders.  As a result, family firms may 
have to pay a premium to raise money from capital markets (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  The pyramidal structure makes it difficult for others to bid 
for family firms, depressing the market valuation of the firm (Barclay & Holderness, 
1989).  These conditions put a capital constraint on growth initiatives of family firms 
(Carney, 2005).  
 Altruism, at the same time, offers some advantages for family firms.  Altruistic 
behavior helps in strengthening family bonds (Simon, 1993).  In the case of family firms, 
the strong bonding between family members fosters loyalty towards the leadership and a 
commitment to work for the long term survival and growth of the organization (Colli, 
43 
 
Fernandez-Perez, & Rose, 2003; Ward, 1987).  Such social bonding is particularly 
important for firms operating in uncertain environments, where institutional infrastructure 
for efficient market based exchanges is not well developed.  This is evident from 
ubiquitous presence of family firms in emerging economies, where they account for a 
large proportion of economic activities (Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, 2002; Whyte, 
1996).  Clearly, there are some advantages of family firms that contribute to the 
competitive advantages of these firms. 
 Carney (2005) argues that family based governance model itself lends significant 
competitive advantage to family firms due to three characteristics associated with family 
governance – parsimony, personalism, and particularism.  Parsimony refers to careful 
resource conservation which family controlled firms pursue in order to preserve family 
wealth.  Parsimony results from the incentive structure in family firms that minimizes 
traditional agency problems, while encouraging efficiency (Durand & Vargas, 2003).  
High family ownership means that firms have strong incentives to efficiently deploy the 
capital and control different costs (Brickly & Dark, 1987).  A direct involvement of the 
owner in strategic decisions also means that resources cannot be diverted to activities that 
will destroy the firm value (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  In the case of family firms, the 
owner-manager‘s personal wealth is at stake if a wrong decision is made.  As a result, 
owners are more careful about strategic investment decisions and have incentives to 
minimize the costs.  In resource scarce environments, parsimony offers a significant 
competitive advantage to family firms.   
 Personalism refers to the concentration of organizational authority in one person, 
the owner-manager.  Personalism reduces the bureaucratic controls under which the 
44 
 
managers operate, making it possible for them to employ strategies and solutions that 
reflect the vision of the owner-manager (Chua, Chrisman & Sharma, 1999).  While such 
vesting of authority in one person may make it easy to abuse the authority, it helps in 
quick and efficient decision making in dynamic and uncertain environments.  Finally, 
particularism refers to the owner-manager‘s ability to enforce decision rules that may be 
driven by non-economic considerations.  For example, family firms may continue to use 
a supplier even if alternative sources may offer cheaper options.  While in the short run, 
this decision may be harmful, in the long run, such trust based relationships help firms. 
 While concentrated family ownership imposes capital and managerial constraints, 
it also changes the incentive structure in such a way that firms make a more intensive use 
of the available capital and make strategic decisions with a long time horizon (James, 
1999).  Porter (1998) argues that reliance on capital markets imposes a short-term 
horizon on managers.  On the other hand, when firms face less pressure from capital 
markets, they can undertake strategies with a longer time horizon (Gerlach, 1992).  
Family owners also have a responsibility to preserve the family wealth and leave more 
than what they inherited for their heirs (Zahra, 2003).  These factors lead family firms to 
pursue strategies that have potential to generate competitive advantage in the long run, 
even if such strategies may carry significant risks.   
 Two important points emerge from the above discussion.  First, family 
ownership attenuates the traditional owner-agent conflict observed in the Western firms 
with dispersed ownership.  This makes the monitoring role of the board less important 
and affects the way firms structure their boards.  Second, family ownership, while 
imposing certain costs, also provide several advantages and changes the incentive 
45 
 
structure for undertaking important strategic decisions.  This has strategic and 
performance consequences.  I discuss these issues in the three empirical essays in the 
following chapters. 
Business Group Affiliation 
Business group affiliation is another important aspect of firm governance in emerging 
markets.  Khanna and Rivkin (2001) define a business group as a set of legally 
independent entities, which share several formal and informal linkages and take 
coordinated actions in multiple product and/or geographic markets.  The types of 
inter-linkages that that group affiliated firms share include social ties in the form of 
family, caste, religion, language, ethnicity and region (Encarnation, 1989), as well as 
organizational ties such as presence of common members on the boards, buyer-supplier 
relationships, and financial relationships (Kedia, Mukherjee & Lahari, 2006). 
 Scholars have documented prevalence of business groups in both developed and 
developing economies (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998, Morck & Steier, 2005); however, 
their structures vary a great deal from country to country (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006).  In 
the case of India, business groups present a quasi-governance arrangement, in the sense 
that even though different affiliated firms are legally separate entities, they are under a 
common, informal administrative control (Kedia et al., 2006).  Often these groups are 
also under the control of a family, even though not all affiliated firms in a group may 
have the same level of family ownership.  These business groups operate somewhat 
similar to large, diversified conglomerates, where each division has to strive for the 
attention of the corporate office.  There is significant sharing of resources across group 
affiliated firms, including sharing of human resources.  The managing director of one 
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affiliated company may serve as the board chairman of another affiliated company, and 
many board members may be common, which makes it easy to take coordinated action.   
 These characteristics of a business group also make it easy for the majority 
owners to expropriate firm value at the expense of minority owners.  Scholars have 
found that business groups indulge in tunneling resources through intra-firm transactions 
and providing loans at non-market rates, and leasing of assets (Bertrand, Mehta, & 
Mullainathan, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999).  While such resource sharing is important for 
efficient operations of a business group, it may be detrimental for the short-term 
profitability of the company from which resources are taken.  Since minority investors 
may not have ownership in all the affiliated companies of a group, they are likely to 
suffer.  Business group owners also have incentives to transfer the resources to firms in 
which the controlling family has a higher ownership.  The associated governance 
problem that arises due to conflict between different groups of owners is known as 
principal-principal agency problem (Cho, 1999; Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  The 
principal-principal agency problem is accentuated in the case of emerging markets with 
inadequate laws for the protection of minority shareholders. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter reviews the CG literature with a focus on two key constructs – board of 
directors and ownership structure – used in this dissertation.  First, I review the 
theoretical foundations of CG research.  Based on a review of leading journals in 
management and finance fields, I identify that much of the extant literature uses agency 
theory as the main theoretical lens to analyze governance issue.  I further argue that 
agency theory based prescriptions for corporate governance are inadequate to address 
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governance challenges in different institutional environments. The governance standards 
in a country are shaped by the interaction of political, cultural, social and market forces, 
which make it important to take into account the external context in governance research. 
 With the above premise, I elaborate the governance environment in India, which 
is the empirical context of this dissertation.  I discuss the governance model being 
followed in India, which is a combination of the outsider-dominated market based 
Anglo-Saxon model, and the insider-dominated bank-based model.  Further, I discuss 
the evolution of governance standards in the pre- and post-liberalization era (1991) in 
India.  I show that even though the institutional and socio-cultural environment for 
business is very different in India, the governance codes are primarily based on the 
Anglo-Saxon model, with an emphasis on the monitoring role of the board members. 
 Next I discuss the literature on board of directors.  I argue that board members 
fulfill multiple roles, which can be put in two broad categories - monitoring and control, 
resource acquisition, strategy and service.  The relative importance of these roles varies 
depending on the external governance context in which the firms are embedded.  In the 
case of emerging markets such as India, there is a high incidence of family ownership and 
involvement in running a business, which makes the monitoring role of the board less 
important.  At the same time, emerging markets are characterized as resource scarce 
environments, making the resource acquisition role of the board members relatively more 
important.  These characteristics of the external environment have implications for the 
way firms structure their boards and the kind of strategic and performance benefits they 
derive from boards.  I also discuss that the effectiveness of board members in resource 
provisioning role is dependent on the network relationships and linkages that board 
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members establish for the focal firm. 
 Finally, I discuss two important components of ownership structure for emerging 
market firms – family ownership and business group affiliation. Both family ownership 
and group affiliation entail several costs and benefits and affect a firm‘s reliance on other 
governance mechanisms such as board of directors.  In the following three chapters (3, 4, 











How do firms choose an optimum board structure?  Numerous scandals and corporate 
failures at the turn of 21
st
 century resulted in regulatory authorities in many countries 
prescribing a set of governance practices with an emphasis on the monitoring role of the 
board.  Prominent amongst these were the 1992 Cadbury Committee Report in UK and 
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US.  A key aspect of these and several other reform 
codes was their emphasis on the presence of independent directors on the boards. 
  Conventional wisdom on board structure, based primarily on agency theory, 
suggests that an independent board, compared to a board comprising insiders, is able to 
monitor a firm more effectively, and consequently enhances firm performance (Coles et 
al., 2008).  This is reflected in the governance codes in several countries (Otten, 2007) 
as well as in the beliefs held by various institutions.  For example, both New York Stock 
Exchange and Nasdaq require listed firms to have a majority of independent directors.  
TIAA-CREF and CALPERS, two large US based pension funds, have a stated preference 
to invest in firms that have a majority of outsiders on their boards.  There is, however, 
no consensus about the superiority of an independent board with respect to firm 
performance (Dalton & Dalton, 2011), or even about the primary function of the board in 
a firm (Brennan, 2006).    
In view of the conflicting findings with respect to board independence – firm 
performance relationship, scholars have cautioned against pressuring firms to conform to 
a single model of board composition (Bhagat & Black, 2001; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
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2003; McConnell, 2002).  An independent board is expected to minimize the traditional 
agency conflict between the owner and managers.  However, the principal-agent conflict 
becomes subordinate to principal-principal conflict in many situations where majority 
owners also work as managers and misappropriate the firm value at the expense of 
minority owners (Dharwadkar, et al., 2000).  Under such situations, the importance of 
independent directors diminishes as the monitoring role becomes less important.  At the 
same time, boards are expected to perform several other roles such as strategy and service, 
which take precedence over the monitoring role under certain conditions.  Depending on 
the relative importance of different roles, firms are expected to structure their board that 
would maximize the effectiveness of the board in fulfilling those roles.  Recognizing the 
multiple roles that board members perform, Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggest that 
board composition depends on which theoretical standpoint a scholar assumes.  
Scholars in recent years have proposed that optimal board structure can be 
decided by taking a holistic view on different roles of directors.  For example, Raheja 
(2005) proposed that board composition should depend on firm and director 
characteristics, and there are cross sectional variations depending on firm characteristics.  
He concluded that in some cases, presence of insiders may be important for the 
monitoring role as they are better informed about the quality of projects being proposed 
by the CEO.  Adams and Ferreira (2007) extended Raheja‘s work to argue that 
management friendly board may be optimal as CEOs may be reluctant to reveal insider 
information to independent members who are a tougher monitor.  In both these 
theoretical models, the emphasis is on increasing the effectiveness of the board in its 
monitoring role.  I extend this line of inquiry in two ways.  First, I argue that relative 
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importance of monitoring and advising/resource dependence roles vary depending on the 
context.  Second, I argue that optimal board structure is dependent not only on firm 
characteristics, as is suggested by the extant literature, but also on the governance context 
which determines the relative importance of monitoring and advising/resource 
dependence roles.   
Consequently, I consider two sets of factors that determine the relative importance 
of various board functions, and consequently the board structure.  First, I propose that 
the ownership structure of a firm determines its internal governance context (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003).  Ownership structure affects the nature and type of agency problems a 
firms faces, and consequently has an effect on board structure.  Second, in several 
emerging economies, some firms arrange themselves in the form of a business group.  
Group affiliation is a consequence of institutional (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; Leff, 1978), 
socio-cultural (Encarnation, 1989; Guillen, 2000), as well as political conditions in a 
country (Evans, 1979; Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998).  In the case of emerging economies, 
group affiliation works as a quasi-governance mechanism (Kedia et al., 2006; Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000b), which has a consequence for the board structure that firms assume.  
Further, ownership structure, which represents the internal governance context, and 
business group affiliation, which represents the external governance context interact with 
each other in affecting the board composition. 
I use an integration of agency theory and resource dependence view with 
institutional perspective to predict board structure based on internal and external factors.  
Agency theory and resource dependence are two dominant theoretical perspectives that 
extant literature has used to analyze board functions (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  
52 
 
Agency theory and resource dependence view are two somewhat contrasting views on 
different roles that a board assumes.  I argue that using an institutional theory, we can 
decipher the relative importance of these roles in a given context.  In the following 
section, I elaborate on this to develop specific hypotheses about antecedents of board 
structure. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Background 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, emerging economy firms are characterized by a high level of 
family involvement through different mechanisms such as business group affiliation, 
family ownership and presence of family members in the firm management and boards.  
These characteristics minimize the incidence of agency problems, making the monitoring 
role of the board less important (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  However, firms still face 
institutional pressures to conform to the dominant practice of constituting boards with a 
focus on monitoring role.  According to neo-institutional theory, organizations tend to 
become isomorphic to each other to gain legitimacy in the external environment 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  The isomorphic pressures arise through coercive, mimetic 
and normative mechanisms.  In the case of corporate governance practices, the coercive 
pressures come from deliberate actions of governments and regulatory agencies.  There 
was a proliferation of corporate governance codes around the world, modeled on the 1992 
Cadbury Committee Report and the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley act, both of which emphasize 
on minimizing the agency problems (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Otten, 2007).  
Listing requirements of several leading stock exchanges around the world make it 
mandatory for firms to constitute their boards according a given set of guidelines, which 
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often require firms to have a certain percentage of board members as independents.   
In a content analysis of corporate governance codes from 38 countries, Otten 
(2007) identified 17 concepts around which the governance codes were written.  Some 
of these concepts include issues such as incentive plans and bonuses, constitution of 
different committees, rules governing auditor appointment and operation, shareholder 
rights and voting, importance of institutional investors and other stakeholders and social 
reporting.  Twelve of these 17 concepts can be linked to agency related issues of 
monitoring and control.  Clearly, there is an increasing convergence towards agency 
based view in the governance standards across the world, both at the regulatory level 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004) as well as at the firm level (Khanna et al., 2006).  
Firms are forced to conform to these governance codes, irrespective of whether a code is 
appropriate or not in a given context. 
The mimetic and normative pressures arise due to the diffusion of a given set of 
governance practices in the larger population of organizations.  Over time, the agency 
based view on governance has been accepted as conceptually correct, making it very 
prevalent, particularly amongst firms coming from Anglo-American tradition (Khanna et 
al., 2006).  With increasing globalization, firms in emerging markets have a high level 
of exposure to foreign firms.  In an effort to be seen as similar to foreign firms, domestic 
firms adopt practices that are followed by foreign firms.  The agency based view on 
board composition has also been accepted as the appropriate one by several accreditation 
agencies that provide rankings of corporate governance standards in firms.  This creates 
normative pressures for firms to conform to the dominant logic when it comes to 
constituting their boards. 
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While firms may constitute their board in conformity with the agency logic due to 
institutional pressures, the resource dependence function of board is something that firms 
need for their good health in emerging markets.  At the same time, owners select board 
members not only to monitor the management, but also to keep control over the firm. 
Constitution of the board thus, becomes an issue of balancing the institutional pressures, 
along with the internal requirements.  The internal governance environment of a firm as 
represented by the ownership structure and the external governance context as 
represented by business group affiliation play an important role in determining the board 
composition.  In the next section, I develop hypotheses about the effect of these factors 
on board composition. 
Family Ownership and Board Composition 
Ownership structure determines the type of agency problems a firm faces in two ways.  
First, ownership structure has a direct bearing on the principal-agent conflict (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983).  If a firm has dispersed ownership, management becomes very powerful 
as dispersed owners do not have motivation and ability to control the management 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  Consequently, managers may indulge in self-serving 
behavior at the expense of shareholders.  Research has shown a positive linkage 
between ownership concentration and firm performance around the world, which scholars 
attribute to the minimization of principal-agent conflict in firms with high ownership 
concentration (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  In the case 
of emerging economies, a higher ownership concentration, often in the hands of the 
controlling family, may also substitute for the absence of strong external governance 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  A high ownership concentration allows owners to take up 
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the management role, eliminating the principal-agent problem altogether (Carney, 2005; 
Schulze et al., 2001).  
Second, ownership structure affects principal-principal agency problems.  
Concentrated ownership in the hands of a family may result in exploitation of minority 
shareholders, as family may pursue actions that are not always in the best interest of the 
firm (Bertrand et al., 2002). A majority owner may also exploit the minority owners 
using pyramidal ownership structures or complex interlocking ownership arrangements 
(Almedia & Wolfenzon, 2006) and tunnel the resources from the focal firm.  The 
problem of expropriation of minority owners at the hands of majority owners is 
somewhat unique to emerging markets with weak external governance environment.  A 
high level of family ownership minimizes the traditional principal-agent conflict, but 
aggravates the principal-principal conflict.   
Given the above characteristics of family ownership, it is not surprising that firms 
with family ownership conduct business in a distinct manner (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 
2003; Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia & Larraza-Kintana, 2010).  Family owners work 
with a relatively longer time horizon as compared to non-family owners, selecting riskier 
projects that have potential to pay handsomely in the long run (Block & MacMillan, 1993; 
Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005).  Family owners also want to keep a tight strategic as 
well as operational control, while at the same time making their firms look very 
professional (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  Firms accomplish these tasks in two ways.  
First, in order to exercise tight control over strategic and operational matters, family 
owned firms prefer to maintain unity of command by having board chair same as the 
CEO.  Research has shown that CEO duality brings unity of command and purpose at 
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the top of the organization (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  CEO duality helps avoid 
conflicts at the top, and facilitates coordination and more effective decision making 
(Finkelstein & D‘Aveni, 1994).  The role of board chair is to ensure proper functioning 
of the board by conducting board meetings, developing and approving the agenda of 
board meetings and constituting appropriate sub-committees (Brennan, 2006).  By 
keeping the board chair position in control, firms can minimize the interference by board 
members (Westphal & Zajac, 1995).   
With a tight control over board affairs through CEO duality, firms can attend to 
the issue of external legitimacy by having more independent directors on the board.  
Anderson and Reeb (2003) argued that family members prefer to have independent 
directors for the resource provisioning role.  Independent directors signal to the market 
that the firm is professionally managed, with good corporate governance standards.  
Independent directors are also usually individuals of high social standing, and bring 
reputational benefits and linkages with the external environment for the firms in which 
they serve. At the same time, given that board members represent the interests of the 
owners, independent directors do not pose any serious challenge to the owners‘ control 
over firm.  As a result, I expect firms with high level of family ownership to have more 
independent directors for external legitimacy, but CEO duality for maintaining tight 
control. 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Firms with greater family ownership will have more 
independent members on the boards. 
 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Firms with greater family ownership are more 





Business Group Affiliation and Board Composition 
A business group is a collection of legally independent firms, that share many formal and 
informal ties and take coordinated actions (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001).  Inadequate 
development of capital market, labor market and product markets created institutional 
voids which created the conditions necessary for business groups to flourish in countries 
such as India (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).  Over time, as the institutions needed for 
market-based exchanges develop, the relevance and logic of business group affiliation 
become questionable (Hoskisson et al., 2005; Lee, Mande & Ortman, 2004).  Even with 
the changes in the external environment, group affiliated firms continue to dominate the 
corporate landscape in many emerging economies.   
Business groups represent a different type of governance arrangement.  While 
group affiliated firms are legally separate entities, they share each other‘s resources and 
capabilities (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005).  They also help each other by way of preferential 
treatment in procurement, pricing and intra-group loans.  Scholars have shown that 
group affiliated firms such as Keiretsu members in Japan experience less fluctuations in 
profit over time due to profit and loss sharing between member firms (Lincoln, Gerlach, 
& Ahmadjian, 1996).  While such governance arrangements may be effective for long 
term survival and profitability of firms, they also pose challenges for minority 
shareholders.  There is evidence of tunneling in group affiliated firms, which is 
essentially a misappropriation of firm value at the expense of minority shareholders.  
Consequently group affiliated firms face a greater scrutiny about their governance than 
unaffiliated firms.  While constituting a board, group affiliated firms also face a greater 
level of institutional pressures to have good governance due to two reasons – a higher 
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level of visibility and pressure from sister firms.   
Group affiliated firms have a higher level of visibility because in general, groups 
are both older and larger than standalone firms.  Even the smaller firms in a group feel 
the institutional pressure due to the overall visibility of the group.  A high level of 
visibility would mean that the strategy and structure of a group affiliated firm is more 
closely observed, making it difficult for them to defy, avoid or manipulate institutional 
pressures.  Second, group affiliated firms face pressure from other sister firms to 
conform to institutional norms as actions of any one firm have consequences for other 
firms in a group.  Unaffiliated firms, on the other hand, have less visibility than the 
group affiliated firms, and can, to some extent, manipulate and avoid institutional 
pressures.   
In addition to legitimacy concerns, groups also want to include independent 
members due to their resource dependence role.  It has been argued that business groups 
are successful partly because of complex social ties (Guillen, 2000) and overt or covert 
support from governments and other external agents (Evans, 1979; Ghemawat & Khanna, 
1998).  Independent members provide crucial linkages to various actors in the 
environment and help secure critical resources (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  Thus, group 
affiliated firms are more likely to include independent members in their boards. 
While the legitimacy and resource dependence concerns require group affiliated 
firms to include more independent members in their boards, groups are also concerned 
with effective control of and coordination between member firms (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000a), which require less interference by outsiders in the functioning of a firm.  Group 
affiliated firms have a greater need of control and coordination as compared to standalone 
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firms as they need to share resources and capabilities including capital, technology and 
human resources between different member firms (Keister, 2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2005; 
Shin & Park, 1999).  Firms can achieve the need of coordination and control by unifying 
the role of CEO and board chair.  However, group affiliated firms do not need to have 
the same person as CEO and board chair to have control over the board affairs.  Group 
affiliated firms can draw executives from other affiliated firms to staff the board chair 
position.  While these individuals are not independent, they help satisfy the institutional 
pressures of separating the CEO and board chair positions, while helping the firm 
maintain effective control and coordination.  Accordingly, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): A group affiliated firm will have more independent 
directors in the board than an unaffiliated firm. 
 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): A group affiliated firm is less likely to have CEO 
duality than an unaffiliated firm. 
 
The Joint Effect of Family Ownership and Group Affiliation 
As argued before, group affiliation changes the governance context in which firms 
operate (Carney, 2005).  Group affiliation aggravates the problem of self-control and 
altruism that firms with greater level of family ownership face (Schulze et al., 2001).  
The problem of self-control arises when the ultimate owners pursue strategies that can 
―harm themselves as well as those around them‖ (Jensen, 1998: 48).  Scholars have 
argued that it is difficult to distinguish between the utilities individuals derive from 
rationally motivated actions and self-indulging pursuits (Becker & Murphy 1988; Jensen 
1998; Thaler & Shefrin 1981). A dominant owner may let go a profitability opportunity if 
it threatens the status quo or does not directly benefit the owner (Jensen & Meckling 
1976, Wright et al. 1996).  The problems related to altruism arise when the dominant 
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owner uses his influence in rewarding his associates and family members at the expense 
of the firm.  Scholars have noted that in family controlled firms, family members get 
secure employment and other perquisites that they would otherwise not receive solely 
based on their capability (Gersick, Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg 1997; Ward, 1987). 
 In the case of group affiliated firms, it is easier for owner-managers to indulge in 
activities that may not be in the best interests of the focal firm.  For example, the 
problem of resource tunneling is salient in the case of business groups (Bertrand et al., 
2002).  Such intra-group transfer of resources and capabilities, is however important for 
successful operations of a business group.  Thus, while group affiliated firms face a 
greater level of pressure than unaffiliated firms to conform to good governance standards, 
the business group owner also wants to have a tight control over at least some of the 
affiliated firms, through which the owner can control other firms by way of pyramidal 
ownership structure (Almedia & Wolfenzon, 2006).  Business group owners can 
exercise this control over the group, by choosing some firms in which they keep high 
ownership.  Further the owners can strengthen their control by having less external 
directors and having the same person as CEO and board chair to minimize inference by 
external agents.  Chang (2003) argues that business group owners indeed select some 
firms, in which they keep a higher level of family ownership, for exercising control over 
the rest of the group.  At the same time, other firms of the group can be used to 
showcase the good governance and thereby, attract investments from the market.  
Therefore, I expect group affiliated firms with high level of family ownership to have 





Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The relationship between business group affiliation 
and presence of independent board members is weaker in firms that have 
a higher level of family ownership as compared to those with a lower level 
of family ownership. 
 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The relationship between business group affiliation 
and incidence of CEO duality is stronger in firms that have a higher level 
of family ownership as compared to those with a lower level of family 
ownership. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample  
The sample of this study comprises all the publicly listed firms that have provided details 
on their board composition to the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), the leading exchange 
in India.  As of April 30, 2011, there were a total of 4946 listed firms in BSE.  Out of 
these, 575 firms are very small in size (paid up capital less than 30 million INR), and are 
not required to provide information on board composition.  Another 1247 firms are 
suspended from BSE due to various reasons and not included in my sample.  This leaves 
me with a sample of 3124 listed firms.  These firms are required to submit details on 
their board composition with the BSE.  However, only 2689 firms submitted details on 
their board composition with the BSE as of April 30, 2011.  These 2689 firm constitute 
the base sample of this study.   
I obtained firm specific details including ownership structure from the Prowess 
database, which has detailed, longitudinal information on about 20,000 Indian firms.  
After merging the firm specific data with the board level data on my sample firms, I lose 
about 400-500 firms due to missing data on firm specific variables for different years.  
Further, I lag the explanatory variables by one year, resulting in loss of observations for 
one year (2001).  This leaves me with an unbalanced panel of 16,598 firm-year 
observations over eight years from 2002 to 2009. 
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 Several other scholars have used the Prowess database to study Indian firms (e.g., 
Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; Bertrand et al., 2002, Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Ramaswami et al., 
2002).  I obtained the board level information from Directors Database.  The Directors 
Database has not been used in academic research yet to the best of my knowledge.  
However, the information provided in Directors Database is very reliable as it is linked to 
the Bombay Stock Exchange.  Listed firms are legally bound to provide accurate 
information to the Bombay Stock Exchange.   
Variables 
Dependent variables. There are two dependent variables to measure board structure – 
board independence and CEO duality.  I measure board independence as a ratio of 
independent directors to total directors.  CEO duality refers to a situation when the CEO 
of the firm also serves as the chairman of the board.  I measure CEO duality by an 
indicator variable which take a value of one when board chairman is same as CEO and 
zero otherwise.  I also adopt a stronger definition of CEO duality in robustness tests in 
which I consider a firm to have CEO duality if the board chair is a relative of the CEO, 
even when these positions are occupied by different individuals.   
Explanatory variables.  The key explanatory variables in this study are related to the 
ownership structure and business group affiliation.  I measure family ownership as a 
total percentage of ownership held by a related family. I use a natural logarithm of this 
variable in the analyses.  Prowess database provides ownership data on family 
ownership as a separate category.  The ownership data provided by Prowess has been 
used in other studies on ownership structure of Indian firms (Ramaswami et al., 2002). 
 I measure business group affiliation using an indicator variable, which takes a 
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value of one if a firm is a member of a business group and zero otherwise.  The Prowess 
database provides unambiguous information about the business group membership and 
has been used in many other studies (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; Chacar & Vissa, 2005). 
Control variables. I include several firm specific, board specific, and industry specific 
controls.  Firm specific controls include firm size, prior performance, 
internationalization, institutional ownership and public ownership.  Firm size is a natural 
logarithm of total assets.  I measure internationalization through a binary variable which 
takes a value of one if a firm exports and zero otherwise.  Institutional and public 
ownership variables are the percentage of shares held by these two groups of investors 
respectively. 
I also control for board size and industry membership.  Board size is a natural 
logarithm of the count of total board members.  I control for industry effects through 
nine indicator variables for 10 primary industries to which my sample firms belong. 
Analytic Procedure 
I tested the hypotheses using a firm-year unit of analysis over the nine-year period from 
2001-2009.   In the models in which board independence is the dependent variable, I 
use random effects, Generalized Least Square (GLS) estimation procedure.  GLS 
models provide corrections for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in 
pooled time series data (Hsiao, 1995).  This methodology allows researchers to examine 
variations among cross-sectional units simultaneously with variations within individual 
units over time (Hsiao, 1995).  It assumes that regression parameters do not change over 
time and do not differ between various cross-sectional units, enhancing the reliability of 
the coefficient estimates.  I use random effects estimation in place of fixed effects 
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estimation since some of the variables such as controls for group affiliation and industry 
membership are static over time.  In the models in which the dependent variable is board 
leadership position (whether the board chair and CEO are the same or not), I use panel 
data logit estimation. 
RESULTS 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. As can be seen from Table 
3.1, on an average, boards in Indian firms have seven members, with 45 percent of them 
being identified as independents. Further, in the case of 45 percent firms in the sample, 
the CEO also occupies the position of the chairman.  The mean family ownership in 
these firms is about 12 percent.  All the correlations are modest suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a concern in regression models. 
Table 3.2 presents the results of random effects GLS estimation on board 
independence.  Hypothesis 1a predicts a positive relationship between family ownership 
and presence of independent members.  The coefficient of family ownership is positive 
and significant (Table 3.2, Model 2: β = 0.006, p < .001), giving support to Hypothesis 1a.  
Hypothesis 2a predicts that group affiliated firms are more likely to have more 
independent members on their boards than unaffiliated firms.  The coefficient of group 
affiliation is positive and significant (Table 3.2, Model 2: β = 0.032, p < .001), giving 
support to Hypothesis 2a.  Hypothesis 3a predicts that the positive relationship between 
group affiliation and board independence is weaker in firms with a higher level of family 
ownership than in firms with a lower level of family ownership.  The coefficient of the 
interaction term is negative and significant (Table 3.2, Model 3: β = 0.007, p < .001), 
giving support to Hypothesis 3a.   
65 
 




Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 CEO Duality 0.447 0.497 -- 
         
2 Board Independence 0.450 0.203 0.021 -- 
        
3 Firm Size* 3.829 2.365 -0.100 0.111 -- 
       
4 Prior Performance* -0.06 0.115 -0.010 0.002 0.061 -- 
      
5 Board Size* 1.986 0.437 -0.126 0.315 0.402 0.022 -- 
     
6 International (=1) 0.616 0.486 -0.074 0.106 0.553 0.046 0.256 -- 




1.368 1.294 -0.114 0.074 0.436 0.011 0.251 0.233 -- 
   
8 Public Ownership* 3.825 0.474 0.030 0.105 -0.143 -0.008 -0.041 -0.053 0.107 -- 
  
9 Family Ownership* 1.159 1.603 0.090 0.080 0.005 -0.004 0.085 -0.019 -0.091 -0.007 -- 
 
10 Group Affiliation 0.353 0.478 -0.168 0.137 0.334 -0.004 0.184 0.176 0.317 0.025 -0.196 -- 
 
n = 16,598 firm year observations (2002-2009); 
* logarithmic transformation; 




TABLE 3.2: Results of Random Effects GLS Estimation on Board Independence  
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control variables       
Firm size 0.009*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001 
Prior Profitability -0.008 0.006 -0.007 0.006 -0.007 0.006 
Board Size 0.200*** 0.003 0.193*** 0.003 0.194*** 0.003 





CEO Duality   0.035*** 0.007 0.037*** 0.007 0.037*** 0.007 
Institutional Ownership -0.009*** 0.001 -0.010*** 0.001 -0.010*** 0.001 
Public Ownership 0.040*** 0.004 0.039*** 0.004 0.038*** 0.004 
Main Effects       
Family Ownership   0.006*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001 
Group Affiliation (Group)   0.031*** 0.008 0.036*** 0.008 
Interaction       
Group x Family Ownership     -0.007*** 0.002 
Total R
2
 0.077 0.083 0.083 
Wald χ2  5159.96*** 5222.78*** 5245.62*** 
∆ χ2   62.82*** 22.84*** 
 
n = 16598 firm-year observations. 
*** p<0.001;  
** p<0.01;  
* p<0.05;  
†




TABLE 3.3: Results of Panel Data Logit Estimation on CEO Duality (= 1) 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control variables       
Firm size -0.094* 0.042 -0.014 0.043 -0.008 0.043 
Prior Profitability 0.026 0.249 -0.015 0.252 -0.006 0.253 
Board Size -0.785*** 0.147 -0.892*** 0.151 -0.863*** 0.154 
Internationalization 
Dummy  
-0.169 0.143 -0.155 0.146 -0.162 0.145 
Board Independence  1.226*** 0.282 1.277*** 0.286 1.239*** 0.292 
Institutional Ownership -0.244*** 0.055 -0.156** 0.055 -0.148** 0.056 





Main Effects       
Family Ownership   0.089** 0.031 0.068* 0.035 
Group Affiliation (Group)   -1.873*** 0.177 -1.992*** 0.188 
Interactions       





 -3186.03 -3126.27 -3124.83 
Wald χ2  138.32*** 290.66*** 293.62*** 
∆ χ2   152.34*** 2.96* 
 
n = 16598 firm-year observations. 
*** p<0.001;  
** p<0.01;  
* p<0.05;  
†






Table 3.3 presents the results of panel data logit estimation on CEO duality.  
Hypothesis 1b predicts a positive relationship between family ownership and CEO 
duality.  The coefficient of family ownership is positive and significant (Table 3.3, 
Model 2: β = 0.089, p < .01), giving support to Hypothesis 1b.  Hypothesis 2b 
predicts that group affiliated firms are less likely to have CEO duality than 
unaffiliated firms.  The coefficient of group affiliation is negative and significant 
(Table 3.3, Model 2: β = -1.873, p < .001), giving support to Hypothesis 2b.  Finally, 
Hypothesis 3b predicts that the relationship between business group affiliation and 
incidence of CEO duality is stronger in firms that have a higher level of family 
ownership as compared to those with a lower level of family ownership.  The 
coefficient of the interaction term is positive, but only marginally significant (Table 
3.3, Model 3: β = 0.114, p < .10), giving weak support to Hypothesis 3b. Table 3.4 
presents a summary of the hypotheses and findings of this chapter. 
Table 3.4: Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
 
Board Independence CEO Duality 
 
Predicted Result Predicted Result 
Family Ownership + Supported + Supported 
Business Group Affiliation + Supported - Supported 




To gain further insights into the joint effect of family ownership and group 
affiliation on board composition, I plotted the interaction effect predicting board 
independence (H3a) in Figure 3.1.  As shown in the figure, group affiliated firms 
(H2a) and firms with a higher level of family ownership (H1a) are more likely to have 
a greater level of board independence.  Further, as the family ownership increases, 
the percentage of independent board members also increase; however, the increase is 
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much sharper for unaffiliated firms than for group affiliated firms, as hypothesized in 
the interaction hypothesis (H3a).   






DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the antecedents of board structure for Indian firms.  Utilizing 
a multi-theoretic framework linking agency and resource dependence with 
institutional theory, I argue that advising and resource dependence role of the board is 
more important than the monitoring role in the case of emerging economies such as 
India.   However, firms face institutional pressures to structure their board according 
to agency theory based prescriptions.  Consequently, firms conform to the 
institutional pressures as ceremonial adoption rather than actual adoption of agency 
theory based prescriptions of board structure. 
 I examine both internal and external factors that influence a firm‘s choice of 
its board structure.  More specifically, I examine the individual and joint effect of 
family ownership and business group affiliation on two dimensions of board structure 
– presence of independent directors and CEO duality. The findings, based on a 
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sample of listed Indian firms during 2001-2009, suggest that firms with high family 
ownership are more likely to have more independent directors, but less likely to have 
an independent board chair.  With respect to business group affiliation, I find that 
group affiliated firms have more independent members and a separation of the 
position of CEO and board chair.  There is also a significant interaction between 
family ownership and group affiliation.  Group affiliated firms with a high level of 
family ownership are less likely to have independent board members or an 
independent person acting as board chair. 
 Before I conclude, the limitations of this study need to be noted.  This study 
is based on a sample of Indian firms, which raises questions about the generalizability 
of this study‘s findings to other contexts.  However, to the extent that we should not 
strive towards ‗one size fits all‘ model (Aguilera et al., 2008), it is important to 
accumulate findings from different contexts.  In this sense, the empirical context of 
this study provides useful supplement to the extant literature, much of which is based 
in the Western contexts where monitoring role may be more important due to 
dispersed ownership and relatively less involvement of family.  Second, in this study, 
I developed arguments for only governance specific antecedents of board composition.  
There are several other firm specific characteristics, which I control for and find a 
significant effect on board structure.  Future studies can develop and test a more 
comprehensive model predicting board composition. 
Despite these limitations, this study makes important theoretical and empirical 
contributions.  I argue for and show the importance of context in the study of firm 
governance in general and governance through board in particular.  The monitoring 
role of the board, which is emphasized by the policy makers and other institutions, 
may not be important in the case of emerging economies where owners also act as 
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managers.  At the same time, firms have to conform to the external institutional 
pressures.  Consequently, emerging market firms structure their board to satisfy the 
twin demands of internal requirements and agency theory based prescriptions about 
board composition.  In the next two essays I show that firms which structure boards 
keeping in mind the resource provisioning and advisory roles of the board members 
are more successful in pursuing growth opportunities and have superior performance 
than other firms.  This is an important departure from extant literature, which 
primarily focuses on the monitoring role of the board, in developing theoretical 
models to predict board composition (Adams & Ferreira; 2007; Raheja, 2005).   
With respect to the business group literature, I show that group affiliated firms 
have more independent directors and absence of CEO duality, in line with the agency 
theory based prescriptions.  However, family owners maintain a tight control over 
the group by having less board independence in firms in which they maintain a higher 
ownership.  Through a few such firms in a group, family owners can maintain tight 
control over all other firms.  This is a theoretically important finding as it shows the 
mechanism of control and cooperation in group affiliated firms.   
Finally, this study‘s approach to integrate agency and resource dependence 
view with institutional theory can provide a useful theoretical lens to understand 
governance issues facing emerging economy firms.  While some scholars have 
acknowledged the importance of resource dependence role of the board of directors 
(Johnson et al., 1996, Hillman et al., 2000), the monitoring role continues to dominate 
much of the academic research (Judge, 2009).  Additionally, extant literature fails to 
identify the contingencies based on which the importance of different roles varies.  I 
argue that we can resolve the issue of relative importance of various roles of a board 
by examining the governance context in which firms operate.   
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To conclude, this study examines the role of internal and external governance 
factors as determinants of board independence and leadership structure in the case of 
Indian firms.  I argue that emerging economy firms constitute boards keeping in 
mind the institutional pressures and internal requirements, which are sometimes at 
conflict with the institutional pressures.  I find that family ownership and business 






CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, BOARD NETWORKS AND  
GROWTH STRATEGIES 
 
There are two broad streams of research linking corporate governance to firm level 
growth strategies.  First, building on the tenets of agency theory, scholars have 
argued that managers want to pursue growth strategies by diversifying into new 
product and geographic markets to minimize their employment risks (Denis, Denis, & 
Sarin, 1997; Palich, Cardinal & Miller, 2000) and increase their compensation 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  These 
growth strategies may not be in the best interests of the principals and may not always 
result in enhancing the value of the firm (Comment & Jarrell, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 
1994).  This stream of research takes a negative view on managers and suggests that 
owners should employ mechanisms to align the interests of the managers with their 
own interests as well as to monitor the managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983, 1985).  
Board of directors and ownership concentration are two important mechanisms to 
make sure that managers are working in the best interests of the owners.   
 This view has been contested by some scholars from the strategy domain, 
who question the basic assumptions of the agency theory that managers want to 
maximize their personal gains at the cost of the organizations that they serve (Lane, 
Cannella & Lubatkin, 1998).  This stream of research takes a more positive view on 
managers and argues that managers are good stewards who pursue strategies keeping 
in mind the interests of the firms in which they serve (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991).  Both these streams, however, make strong assumptions about 
managerial behavior and the motivation and incentives of the owners to monitor the 
managers.  While agency theory based explanations consider human actors to be 
inherently deceitful and un-trustworthy, stewardship theory based explanations 
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consider human actors to be always driven by the ‗good intentions‘.   
 These conflicting views call into question the appropriate role of different 
corporate governance mechanisms in a firm.  Should the board of directors focus on 
monitoring the managerial actions or should they focus in assisting the managers in 
strategic planning and accessing resources from the external environment?  
Furthermore, recent research has shown that the interests of the owners and managers 
may not necessarily be divergent, particularly in contexts where owners are actively 
engaged in the management (Carney, 2005; Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  In situations 
where owners are involved in the management of the firm, traditional agency 
problems become less important (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003).  Different 
corporate governance mechanisms such as board of directors and ownership 
concentration are traditionally designed to minimize the conflict between the owners 
and the managers.  For example, one of the important functions of the board 
members is to limit the extent of unrelated diversification that managers want to 
pursue (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Ramaswami et al., 2002).  However, if unrelated 
diversification enhances the value of the firm, as is the case in some emerging 
markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001), then what is the 
appropriate role of different governance mechanisms? 
 In this essay, I address the above question by examining the linkage between 
two important governance mechanisms (board of directors and ownership structure), 
and two important growth strategies (growth through new domestic ventures and 
growth through new international investments).  Building on Chapter 3, I argue that 
independent board members, by virtue of their resource dependence role, help firms in 
pursuing growth.  Further, the network centrality that a firm achieves through its 
board members also helps in pursuing growth.  The positive benefits from network 
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centrality are stronger if the centrality is a result of internal members than if it is due 
to external members.  Finally, family owners in emerging market firms, due to their 
long time horizon (Block & MacMillan, 1993), prefer growth through foreign 
investments as compared to growth through new domestic investments.  Family 
ownership also conditions the effect of board independence on growth strategies. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Background 
Strategic decisions, such as investments in new projects or new markets, have long 
term consequences for organizational survival and success.  One of the fundamental 
issues in the management literature is to have the mechanisms to make sure that 
managers take these strategic decisions in the best interests of the owners.  Board of 
directors and ownership concentration are two important mechanisms to make sure 
that managers are working in the best interests of the owners.  There are two issues 
about the role of different governance mechanisms that require a closer scrutiny. 
 First, the performance consequences of growth strategies such as product and 
international diversification are not consistent across different contexts.  With 
respect to the relationship between product diversification and firm performance, a 
general consensus, based on research in developed markets, is that moderate level of 
diversification in related areas has positive performance consequences while a high 
level of diversification in unrelated areas has negative performance consequences 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Lane et al., 1998; 
Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).  Likewise, with respect to growth through international 
diversification, scholars have shown that developed market firms experience negative 
performance effect at the low levels of international diversification, which turns 
positive at the moderate level and again negative at the very high level of international 
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diversification (Contractor, Kundu & Hsu, 2003; Lu & Beamish, 2004).  Based on 
these findings several scholars argue that firms should have governance mechanisms 
in place to make sure that managers do not pursue excessive growth through product 
diversification or international diversification (Lane et al., 1998). 
 However, much of this theoretical development and empirical evidence is 
based on firms in the developed market contexts.  These findings have been 
questioned in the context of emerging markets such as South Korea and India where 
firms have historically sustained a very high level of unrelated diversification and 
even outperformed their less diversified counterparts (Chang & Choi, 1988; Khanna 
& Rivkin, 2001). Khanna and Rivkin (2001) analyzed the diversification-performance 
relationship in 14 emerging markets and found that firms affiliated to diversified 
business groups were more profitable than the focused, unaffiliated firms in six of the 
14 emerging markets.  Khanna and Palepu (2000) provide a more detailed analysis 
of diversified business groups in India and find that firms affiliated to highly 
diversified business groups outperformed their counterparts that operated in single 
industries as well as other firms that were affiliated to moderately diversified business 
groups.  With respect to international diversification, Gaur and Kumar (2009) find 
that the effect of internationalization on performance remains positive at low as well 
as high levels of internationalization in the case of firms from emerging markets such 
as India.  Given that the performance consequences of growth strategies are context 
dependent, we need to reassess the role of governance mechanisms in affecting the 
growth strategies. 
 Second, much of the extant literature assumes that there is a divergence in the 
interests of the managers and the owners, and therefore, owners need governance 
mechanisms to make sure that managers pursue the interests of the owners and not 
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their own interests (Daily et al., 2003).  However, in certain contexts and situations, 
the interests of owners and managers may not be divergent (Carney, 2005; Jensen, 
1994; Zahra, 2003).  For example, Carney (2005) argues that in firms with high 
family ownership, there is minimal need to monitor the managers as the owners are 
themselves engaged in the management of the firm.  Such firms have relatively 
reduced incidence of principal-agent conflict.   While there are some other costs of 
having a high level of family involvement, as I discussed in Chapter 2, there are 
different expectations from different governance mechanisms in firms where 
traditional principal-agent conflict is less important. 
 In the following sections, I develop my arguments about the impact of board 
structure and ownership structure on a firm‘s growth strategies.   
Board Structure and Growth Strategies 
One of the biggest constraints firms face in their attempt to grow is the availability of 
qualified personnel (Penrose, 1959).  In order to grow successfully, firms need to 
have a good understanding of their internal resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991) 
as well as the external environment (Porter, 1980).  Developing an understanding of 
the external environment requires careful scanning, monitoring and assessment of the 
potential opportunities and threats.  Once a firm identifies the right set of 
opportunities, they need substantial resource commitments to make use of the 
available opportunities.  Human capital becomes one of the most important resources 
that firms need to successfully manage growth initiatives. 
 As argued in Chapter 2, firms in emerging markets structure their boards 
keeping in mind the resource dependence and advisory role of the board rather than 
just the monitoring role of the board.  A board, comprising more external members is 
likely to fulfill these roles in a better manner than a board that comprises more 
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internal managers.  Consequently, I expect that a board that has more external 
members is more likely to pursue growth strategies as compared to an internally 
dominated board.  There are at least three mechanisms through which external 
members help a firm pursue growth strategies.  
 First, external board members help develop linkages with the external 
environment (Johnson et al., 1996; Hillman et al., 2000), which is an important source 
of competitive advantage in certain contexts.  Firms rely on the external environment 
to gain access to the needed resources for their survival and growth (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  Barney (1991) argues that the source of competitive advantage lies 
in a firm‘s internal resource configurations.  However in the case of emerging 
markets such as India, firms derive their competitive advantages not only from 
internal resources and capabilities, but also the external environment, which allows 
certain types of capabilities to become important (Gaur & Kumar, 2010).  For 
example, while relational capital is important for firms in most contexts, it becomes 
particularly important in environments where the institutions for efficient market 
based exchanges are not well developed (Khanna & Palepu, 2000).  This is evident 
from the success of Korean Chaebols and Indian business groups which rely on 
networks and relational capital for their survival and growth to a great extent. 
 Second, economic liberalization in emerging markets such as India has 
resulted in opening up of many sectors that were restricted for private participation in 
the past.  This offers tremendous growth opportunities for firms in India.  As an 
example, one of the very fast growing sectors in India – telecommunication services – 
was not available for private participation until 1998.  As of 2011, India has the 
second largest telecommunication industry after the USA in terms of number of 
subscribers with a base of about 890 million subscribers.  Economic liberalization 
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has also eased import and export restrictions and made it possible for firms to expand 
in international markets.  In order to make use of the new opportunities made 
available due to changes in the external environment, firms need people who can not 
only guide the firm in choosing the right set of opportunities to pursue but also help 
them in successfully pursuing the chosen opportunities.  External board members 
help in such pursuits. 
Third, growth brings complexity (Covin & Slevin, 1997).  Diversification 
through new ventures in the domestic market as well as international investments 
increase the information processing demands on the top management team due to the 
complexity associated with managing a diverse set of product and geographic markets 
(Singh, Gaur, & Schmid, 2010).  While the internal members have a better 
understanding of the internal task environment, external members possess superior 
understanding of the complexities that can arise by pursuing the new opportunities.  
External members, sometimes, can also provide access to resources that can help 
manage the increased complexity due to the new pursuits.  External members make 
the board more diverse, which increases the information processing capabilities of the 
board (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993).  A more diverse team can be more efficient 
in considering multiple alternatives, identifying mistakes, and correcting them 
(Bilimoria & Wheeler, 2000; Mattis, 2000; Robinson & Deschant, 1997).  As a 
result, a larger presence of external members in the boards is likely to result in higher 
quality of decision making when firms face complex situations.   
 In conclusion, the presence of independent members on the board helps in 
better scanning of the external environment for new opportunities, developing 
linkages with the environment for resources and improves the decision making by 
creating diversity in the board.  Therefore, I expect that firms that have more 
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external members on their boards are more likely to pursue new domestic ventures 
and international investments.   
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Presence of independent members on a board is 
positively related to the new domestic ventures initiated by a firm. 
 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Presence of independent members on a board is 
positively related to the new foreign investments undertaken by a firm. 
 
As discussed earlier, pursuing new opportunities in the domestic and foreign 
markets creates complexity.  Managing this complexity would require that there is 
clarity in decision making authority and the final decision making authority rests with 
one person (Finkelstein & D‘Aveni, 1994).  When the role of CEO and board chair 
is assumed by different individuals, there is division in the decision making authority 
in the firm (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  Scholars have argued that having the same 
person as the board chair and CEO may help in establishing the unity of command 
and control in organizations (Daily & Dalton, 1997; Finkelstein & D‘Aveni, 1994).  
A unified decision making authority may be particularly important when firms need to 
make quick decisions about pursuing the new growth opportunities and managing the 
associated challenges.   
 Decisions to pursue new growth opportunities are not easy ones.  In 
emerging markets such as India, there are often several opportunities, from which 
firms need to choose the most appropriate ones.  While the independent board 
members can bring knowledge about these opportunities and provide linkages with 
the external environment, the decision about which set of opportunities to pursue rests 
on the CEO and internal managers as they have a better understanding of the internal 
task environment (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990).  If the decision making authority 
is not unified, there is likely to be conflict about which strategic opportunities to 
pursue (Li & Li, 2009).  As a result, there may be delay in decision making or even 
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inaction.  Thus CEO duality helps in quick decision making and minimizes conflict 
in the upper echelons about which opportunities to pursue.  Accordingly I propose: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): CEO duality is positively related to the new 
domestic ventures initiated by a firm. 
 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): CEO duality is positively related to the new 
foreign investments undertaken by a firm. 
 
Network Effects and Growth Strategies 
As discussed in the previous section, successful pursuit of growth strategies requires 
that firms carefully monitor the environment for the available opportunities.  While 
the board members generally help in identifying and pursuing the growth 
opportunities by establishing linkages with the external environment, the effectiveness 
of board members is dependent on the extent to which they can position the firm 
favorably in the external environment (Gulati, 1998).  In an environment where 
information and resources are not readily available to everyone, firms that are in a 
better position to access these resources are more likely to be successful in pursuing 
growth strategies. 
 Firms do not operate in isolation.  They operate in an intricate network 
comprising other firms, market intermediaries, institutions, governments, industry and 
other formal and informal associations and groupings (Uzzi, 1997).  Directors, being 
part of the upper echelon of a firm, play an important role in developing relationships 
with other actors (firms) in the network.  The relational ties that directors create are 
conduits for the flow of a broad variety of tangible and intangible resources (Davis 
1991; Westphal, Gulati & Shortell, 1997).  The tangible resources include flow of 
money in the form of preferred inter-company loans, technology, intermediary 
products and even personnel.  The intangible resources include information, prestige, 
legitimacy, and preferential treatment in business dealings.  Firms that have access to 
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these tangible and intangible resources may be better placed to pursue growth, both in 
domestic as well as foreign markets. 
 Not all actors in a network are able to derive the benefits discussed above 
(Granovetter, 1982).  The centrality of a firm in the network plays an important role 
in determining the extent of benefits that a firm can derive from the network.  There 
are three common ways of measuring the centrality of a firm in a network – degree, 
closeness and betweenness (Gulati et al, 2002).  Degree centrality is a very simplistic 
measure of network centrality, with a simple count of the number of ties.  Closeness 
centrality identifies how closely the focal firm is connected to other firms in the 
network.  A firm with higher closeness centrality is likely to get information faster 
than another firm with low value of closeness centrality.  Betweenness centrality 
refers to the extent to which the focal firm is in between other firms in a network.  A 
high level of betweenness centrality means that the focal firm works as an 
intermediary in the passage of information or other resources between other firms.  
By virtue of being in the intermediary position, the focal firm may be able to make 
use of the information more effectively than others which are at the periphery of a 
network.   
Thus, a firm, which is more central in the network of other firms by virtue of 
interlocking directorates, is more likely to pursue growth strategies as compared to 
others that are isolated in the network.  Accordingly, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Network centrality (closeness and betweenness) 
through board members is positively related to the new domestic 
ventures initiated by a firm. 
 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Network centrality (closeness and betweenness) 
through board members is positively related to the foreign investments 





Family Ownership and Growth Strategies  
The ownership structure of a firm significantly influences the strategic choices that 
firms make (Lubatkin, Schulze, McNulty, & Yeh, 2003; Zahra, 1996; 2003).  The 
growth strategies such as new domestic ventures and foreign expansion are 
particularly fraught with risks and uncertainty.  In the early stages of a growth 
strategy, the costs are much higher than the rewards.  With respect to 
internationalization strategies, Lu and Beamish (2004) find that internationalization 
depresses firm performance in the early stages, and firms start reaping the benefits 
from internationalization only after they reach a threshold in their internationalization 
trajectory.  Thus the rewards from growth strategies usually accrue in the long run. 
 Agency theory suggests that managers would want to pursue the risky growth 
strategies in order to increase their job security, on-job consumption and 
compensations.  The owners, therefore, need to monitor the managers to make sure 
that managers do not excessively pursue the risky growth strategies.  However, in 
the case of emerging markets, there is often substantial involvement of family 
members, who are also the owners, in running the firm.  Even when family members 
may delegate the management to professional managers, they keep a close watch on 
the actions of the managers, which minimizes the traditional agency problems 
(Carney, 2005; Zahra, 2003).  In such firms, managers‘ identities are often linked to 
the firms that they serve (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003).  As a 
result, managers become stewards who work for the long term interests of the firm. 
 Given the risks associated with pursuing growth strategies, managers are not 
likely to pursue these strategies unless managers have the support of the owners, 
particularly when owners are involved in the decision making.  Owners on the other 
hand, have altruistic motives in deciding which strategies to pursue (Berrone et al., 
84 
 
2010; Schulze et al, 2001).  Altruism in the context of a family firm means that if a 
particular strategy is important and beneficial in the long run and increases the 
employment potential as well as reputation of the family members, then owners 
would want to pursue it even through there may be substantial risks involved (Schulze 
et al., 2003; Zahra, 2003).  The support of owners may lengthen the time horizon for 
payoffs (James, 1999; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003, 2005; Zahra, 2003), making 
it possible for the managers to assume greater risks.  Family members usually have a 
longer time horizon on their investments, with their own future linked to the success 
of the firm (Carney, 2005).  As a result, they devote a great deal of attention in 
analyzing the potential of the growth strategies (Zahra, 2003).  A careful analysis of 
the risks and rewards reduces the negative risk perceptions, making it possible to 
pursue the growth strategies. 
 Several factors make international expansion an attractive strategic option for 
family firms.  Extant literature on internationalization of emerging market firms 
suggests that firms often want to expand to foreign markets to avoid the stifling 
competition in the domestic markets and seek new markets for their tried and tested 
products (Gaur & Kumar, 2010; Luo & Tung, 2007).  When operating in the 
domestic markets, firms face competition not only from domestic firms but also from 
foreign firms that have entered emerging markets in recent years.  With the trade and 
economic liberalization, it has become lot easier for foreign multinational to operate 
in the emerging markets.  While there is debate about the positive and negative 
spillover effects of foreign firms on local firms, there is evidence of some degree of 
crowding out of the local firms as a result of competition from the foreign firms.  
Even without the competition from the foreign firms, domestic competitors are very 
similar in profile to each other and have somewhat similar resources and capabilities.  
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This makes it very difficult for firms to differentiate with each other in markets where 
most local firms compete on commodity type of products (Witt & Lewin, 2007).  
Even when the level of competition may not be very high in the domestic markets, 
venturing into a new segment requires firms to develop new resources and capabilities. 
Firms may find it easier to expand into international markets using their existing 
resources and capabilities, as compared to developing new ones to start a new venture 
in the domestic markets. 
Thus firms enter foreign markets for both exploitation of their existing 
resources as well as exploration purposes (Deeds, Mang, & Frandsen, 2004; Deng, 
2004).  Since the profile of competitors in foreign markets is quite different, firms 
can exploit their core competence in producing price sensitive products 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Del Sol & Kogan; 2007; Kapur & Ramamurti, 2001).  
The success of Chinese manufacturing firms and Indian software and pharmaceutical 
firms in foreign markets underscores this point (Gaur & Kumar, 2010).  Foreign 
markets also provide opportunities for these firms to learn and explore new products 
and technologies, which they can then use in domestic markets.   
 International expansion is also likely to be more rewarding in the long run.  
It is well established in the competitiveness literature that firms need to continuously 
develop new sets of core competencies in order to sustain competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991).  International expansion for exploring new markets, acquiring new 
technological and managerial capabilities and exploiting existing core competencies 
may be the only way for emerging market firms to remain viable in the long run (Gaur 
& Kumar, 2009; 2010).   
 It is easier for firms with family involvement to make a decision to 
internationalize than firms without family involvement (Zahra, 2003).  An important 
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aspect of altruism in family firms is that preserving the family wealth and increasing it 
for the next generations becomes the guiding principal in running the business 
(Schulze et al., 2001).  Given the long run benefits of internationalization, family 
firms are more likely to take the risks for long-term benefits.  Internationalization 
also brings short-run benefits such as the reputation effects.  In the case of emerging 
markets such as India, international expansion is viewed as reputation enhancing.   
 Thus, while on one hand, internationalization is likely to bring more 
long-term benefits than domestic expansion, on the other hand, internationalization 
also brings short-term benefits such as reputational benefits.  As a result, firms with 
family ownership are more likely to pursue growth through international investments 
and less likely to pursue growth through new domestic ventures.  There is some 
evidence to this effect in the extant literature (Lin, 1998; Masurel & Smit, 2000; 
McKibbin & Pistrui, 1997; Parker, 1998; Zahra, 2003).  Simon (1996) found that 
family-run firms achieved a higher degree of internationalization than others in the 
case of German firms.  Zahra (2003), in his analysis of US based family firms found 
that family ownership was positively related to the degree of internationalization.  
Based on these empirical findings and the arguments presented above, I propose a 
negative relationship between family ownership and new domestic ventures and a 
positive relationship between family ownership and foreign investments.  
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): Family ownership is negatively related to the 
new domestic ventures initiated by a firm. 
 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): Family ownership is positively related to the 
foreign investments undertaken by a firm. 
 
The Contingent Value of Board Structure 
While different firm level governance mechanisms have a direct effect on the type of 
strategic choices that firms make, they also interact with each other in affecting a 
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firm‘s growth strategies.  In this section, I examine how board independence 
interacts with family ownership and network relationships to jointly determine the 
strategic choices made by a firm.   
Interaction between board independence and family ownership 
Elsewhere in this dissertation I have argued that firms in emerging markets adopt 
board independence more as a ceremonial adoption rather than as an actual embrace 
of agency theory based prescriptions of appointing an independent board.  Further, 
emerging market firms consider the resource dependence role of the board as more 
important than its monitoring role.  Consequently, the independent directors are 
appointed keeping in mind the resource needs of the firm.  I have also argued that 
independent directors, by virtue of their connections with the external environment, 
help firms in pursuing growth strategies.  However this positive influence of 
independent directors is contingent on what the controlling family wants.  
Owner-managers in family firms are likely to have a great deal of say in selecting the 
board of directors (Ford 1988; Rubenson & Gupta 1996).  If owners do not want to 
pursue a particular growth strategy, board of directors may not be able to influence 
the decision much.   
 With respect to growth through new domestic ventures, I have argued that 
family ownership has a negative influence on this decision.  Even though 
independent board members may provide the information and resources needed to 
start new domestic ventures, firms are not likely to pursue these strategies if owners 
do not consider them to be prudent.  Thus, family ownership is likely to have a 
negative conditioning effect on the influence of board independence on starting new 
domestic ventures.   
 In some cases, the controlling family may not be in a position to have its 
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members in the top management team and the firm may be run by professional 
managers.  Such a scenario may lead to principal-agent conflict.  The board of 
directors in such firms may have a greater loyalty towards the managers than the 
family owners (Jensen, 1998; Schulze et al., 2001).  The professional managers 
usually have a shorter time horizon than family owners (Carney, 2005), whose future 
is tied to the future of the firm.  To minimize their own employment risks, 
professional managers, in collusion with the board of directors, may prefer starting 
new domestic ventures, which have a shorter gestation period, but may not be 
necessarily good for the firm in the long-run.  A higher level of family ownership 
would make it more difficult for firms to pursue such strategies.  Accordingly, I 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): There is a negative interaction between family 
ownership and board independence such that the positive relationship 
between board independence and new domestic ventures is weakened 
if a firm has a higher level of family ownership. 
 
 With respect to growth through foreign investment, I have argued that family 
ownership has a positive influence on this decision.  Even though foreign expansion 
may entail substantial risks, family owners, because of their altruistic motives to grow 
the business for future generations, are willing to take the risk that pays off in the 
long-run (Zahra, 2003).  At the same time, independent board members have a 
positive influence on the choice of growth through foreign investments.  If the board 
members feel that they have the support of the owners (whose interest board members 
are expected to represent), they would be encouraged to help the firm identify and 
pursue new opportunities in the foreign markets.  Foreign expansion is also 
something favored by managers as it increases managers‘ remunerations and on job 
consumption, while reducing their employment risks.  As a result, managers will 
also encourage the board members who are loyal to the managers rather than the 
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owners to help firm pursue international expansion strategies.  Therefore, the 
positive effect of independent directors on foreign investments is likely to get 
magnified in the presence of a high level of family ownership.   
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): There is a positive interaction between family 
ownership and board independence such that the positive relationship 
between board independence and foreign investments undertaken by a 
firm is strengthened if a firm has a higher level of family ownership. 
 
Interaction between board independence and network centrality 
Firm can be central in a network through internal directors or through independent 
directors.  However, firms derive greater benefits from the network if the centrality 
is through internal members than if it through independent members.  There are two 
reasons why network related benefits provided by internal members are superior to 
independent members in exploring growth opportunities.   
First, the institutionalized mandate of independent members is to monitor the 
firm, as prescribed by the governance codes (Brennan, 2006).  On the other hand, the 
institutional mandate for internal directors is to provide strategic direction to the firm 
and to advise and counsel the CEO (Donaldson & Davis, 1994).  Internal members 
are often appointed to the board as a reward to their successful stints within the 
organization.  Their personal success is often linked to the success of the 
organization in which they serve.  Internal members are particularly interested in 
growth opportunities as organizational growth can help in their career growth.  
Consequently, internal members have a very high level of motivation to scan the 
external environment for profitable growth opportunities.  Thus internal members 
are more likely to extract information and derive other advantages from the network 
than independent members. 
Second, internal board members have informational advantage over the 
independent members, who often rely on the CEO and other internal members to 
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provide them with firm-specific information (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990).  
Internal members spend considerably more time within the organization, and 
therefore understand the strengths and weaknesses of their organizations better than 
independent members (Donaldson, 1995; Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  This 
informational advantage helps internal members in more effective screening of the 
information coming from the network so that they can pick out growth opportunities 
that better match the resource configuration of a firm.  Additionally, the network 
connections that internal member provide are likely to be more relevant for the focal 
firm as compared to the connections by the independent members.  As a result, 
internal members are more likely to pick a relevant piece of information from the 
network than independent members. 
There is also an acute shortage of qualified and competent independent 
directors in emerging markets.  The practice of appointing independent directors is 
rather new in the case of emerging markets.  Consequently, the quality of ties 
provided by independent directors in emerging markets is likely to be inferior to the 
quality of ties provided by internal directors.  As a result of all these factors, I expect 
that network centrality will have weaker positive effect on the growth initiatives if a 
firm has more independent directors. 
Hypothesis 6a (H6a): There is a negative interaction between network 
centrality and board independence such that the positive relationship 
between network centrality and new domestic ventures is weakened if a 
firm has more independent board members. 
 
Hypothesis 6b (H6b): There is a negative interaction between network 
centrality and board independence such that the positive relationship 
between network centrality and foreign investments undertaken by a 
firm is weakened if a firm has more independent board members. 
 
 Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present the above hypothesized effects.  
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DATA AND METHODS 
Sample  
I obtained data for this essay from three different data sources – Prowess database of 
the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), Directors Database of 
Bombay Stock Exchange, and Capex database of CMIE.  The Prowess database 
provides information on firm level variables including ownership, business group 
affiliation and international investments.  The Directors Database provides 
longitudinal information on board structure for each firm, based on which I create 
network measures.  The Capex database provides information on new domestic 
ventures initiated by the firms in my sample. 
 The base sample for this essay is the same as the one I used in the previous 
chapter (Chapter 3).  I include all the publicly listed firms, which submitted details 
on their board composition to the Bombay Stock Exchange.  The base sample 
comprised longitudinal data on 2689 firms from 2001-2009.  After list wise deletion 
of cases due to missing values on key explanatory variables and removal of one year 
of data due to lagging (one year) of explanatory variables, I had an unbalanced panel 
of 16,598 firm-year observations over eight years from 2002 to 2009 belonging to 
2152 firms. 
Variables 
Dependent variables.  New domestic ventures and new foreign investments are two 
dependent variables in this essay.  I obtained information on new domestic ventures 
from the Capex database of CMIE. Capex provides details on new ventures initiated 
by a firm in the domestic market.  It also provides the industry in which the new 
venture has been started, and in some cases, the costs involved in creating the new 
ventures.  The Capex database tracks about 50,000 new projects started since 1996.  
I matched the Capex database with the firms in my sample to obtain a list of all the 
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new projects started by the sample firms during 2001-2009.  The firms in my sample 
started 2660 new projects during the study period.  Several firms were involved in 
more than one project.  Consequently, I used a count of the number of project in a 
given year as the dependent variable to measure new domestic ventures.  The 
information on new foreign investments comes from the Prowess database.  Prowess 
database gives only the total value of foreign investments in a given year.  I 
performed a logarithmic transformation on the total value of foreign investments to 
normalize the distribution. 
Explanatory variables.  The explanatory variables include ownership structure, 
board structure, and board networks.  Family ownership, measured as a total 
percentage of ownership held by a related family, represents ownership structure.  
Board independence and CEO duality represent board structure.  I measure board 
independence as a ratio of independent directors to total directors, and CEO duality by 
an indicator variable which take a value of one when board chairman is same as CEO 
and zero otherwise.  
 Board network measures are created by developing board interlocks for each 
firm, for each year, based on the complete sample of publicly listed firm.  I obtained 
information on each member of the board for all firms from Directors Database, 
which is a database of directors of listed Indian firms.  There are a total of about 
20,000 unique directors who sit on the boards of the 2689 firms in my sample.  
Directors Database provides detailed information on each of these directors including 
their demographic details and starting and resignation dates.  Based on this 
information, I created a longitudinal profile of directors for all the firms in my sample 
from 2001 to 2009. 
In order to create board networks, I created a unique identifier for each of the 
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20,000 directors and identified the firms to which they belong.  Next I created three 
matrix structures of all the firms and connected them on the basis of director 
interlocks.  The three matrix structures were based on the ties from all the directors, 
from only internal directors and from only independent directors.  Based on these 
matrix structures of board networks, I calculated network centrality measures for the 
entire network of firms. 
 I measure network effects through two measures of network centrality – 
betweenness centrality and closeness centrality.  Betweenness centrality is measured 
by the frequency with which the focal firm falls between two other firms on the 
shortest paths connecting them (Freeman, 1979).  Closeness centrality is measured 
as the shorted path distance of the focal firm from other firms in the network.  I 
compute these centrality measures based on the ties from a) all the directors of the 
firm, b) only from the internal directors, and c) only from the independent directors.  
Further, I define the networks at two levels – all firm network and intra-industry 
network, resulting in a total of 12 centrality measures (two measures based on three 
types of ties for two types of networks).  I created all these networks for multiple 
years (2001-2009), creating longitudinal data on network measures.  The empirical 
models I present are based on networks of all firms in the sample, based on all the 
directors of a firm.  The use of network of all firms is appropriate in the context of 
this study as many firms are highly diversified and operate in multiple industries.   
Control variables. I include several firm specific, board specific, and ownership 
specific controls.  Firm specific controls include firm size, research and development 
(R&D) intensity, advertising intensity, group affiliation and prior performance.  
Several scholars have linked these firm characteristics to diversification within and 
across national boundaries.  I measure firm size by a natural logarithm of total sales.  
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R&D intensity and advertising intensity are R&D and advertising expenses divided by 
total sales.  I control for financial performance, as measured by return on assets 
(ROA) in the previous year.  Board specific controls include board size, presence of 
CEO relatives in the board and average tenure of board members.  Board size is a 
natural logarithm of total number of board members.  ‗CEO relatives‘ is also 
measured as a natural logarithm of total number of relatives of the CEO present in the 
board.  Average tenure is a natural logarithm of the total tenure of all board members 
divided by board size.  Ownership specific controls include percentage of ownership 
held by institutional investors and retail public investors. Finally, I included controls 
for nine primary industries to which the firms in my sample belong. I lagged all the 
explanatory and control variables by one year. 
Analytic Procedure 
I utilized panel data negative binomial estimation for models predicting new domestic 
ventures.  New domestic ventures is a count variable, which makes traditional OLS 
or GLS based estimations inappropriate.  Negative binomial and Poisson estimation 
are appropriate estimation procedures when the dependent variable comprises count 
data.  Negative binomial is a special case of Poission estimation, which corrects for 
overdispersion in the dependent variable.  In the absence of overdispersion, negative 
binomial reduces to Poisson, making negative binomial a preferred estimation 
procedure. 
 In the models predicting foreign investments, I used random effects GLS 
estimation.  I preferred a GLS regression over pooled OLS regression due to the 
important assumptions of homoskedasticity and no serial correlation in Pooled OLS.  
Pooled OLS requires the errors in each time period to be uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables in the same time period, for the estimator to be consistent and 
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unbiased (Wooldridge, 2002).  A GLS regression is more suitable in that it corrects 
for the omitted variable bias, and presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in 
pooled time series data.  Further I used random-effect estimation over fixed-effect as 
some of the variables, such as group affiliation, are time invariant.  However, in 
order for random-effect estimation to be appropriate, the unobserved heterogeneity 
should not be correlated with the independent variables.  I tested for this assumption 
and the appropriateness of random-effects estimation using Hausman test after 
removing the time invariant variables.  The insignificant Hausman test statistic 
suggested that the assumptions for random effects estimation were not violated.   
RESULTS 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. As can be seen from 
Table 4.1, average number of new domestic ventures started by a firm in a year is 
0.25, while the mean value of foreign investments is 3.6 million INR.  None of the 
correlations are high enough to suggest any problem of multicollinearity.   
Growth in the Domestic Market 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the results of panel data negative binomial estimation on 
new domestic ventures.  The only difference between Tables 4.2 and 4.3 is in the use 
of centrality measure, I use closeness centrality in Table 4.2 and betweenness 
centrality in Table 4.3.   
Hypothesis 1a predicts a positive relationship between board independence 
and new domestic ventures.  The coefficient on board independence is positive and 
significant (Table 4.2, Model 2: β = 0.34, p < .01), giving support to H1a.  
Hypothesis 2a predicts a positive relationship between CEO duality and new domestic 
ventures.  The coefficient on CEO duality is not significant in any model in Tables 
4.2 and 4.3.  H2a is not supported.   
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TABLE 4.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 
1. Domestic Ventures -- 
                
2. Foreign Investments* 0.103 -- 
               
3. Firm size* 0.247 0.248 -- 
              
4. Board Size* 0.139 0.205 0.402 -- 
             
5. Prior Performance 0.009 0.010 0.061 0.022 -- 
            
6. R&D Intensity -0.001 0.001 -0.012 0.006 -0.175 -- 
           
7. Advertising Intensity -0.008 0.189 -0.095 0.085 0.002 0.005 -- 
          
8. CEO Relatives* -0.047 -0.130 -0.099 -0.298 0.002 -0.002 -0.058 -- 
         
9. Inst. Ownership* 0.144 0.307 0.436 0.251 0.011 0.016 0.097 -0.178 -- 
        
10. Public Ownership* -0.081 0.026 -0.143 -0.041 -0.008 -0.001 0.011 -0.041 0.107 -- 
       
11. Average Tenure* -0.039 -0.039 0.158 0.127 0.025 -0.020 -0.070 0.201 -0.044 0.082 -- 
      
12. Group Affiliation 0.054 0.160 0.334 0.184 -0.004 -0.006 0.001 -0.131 0.317 0.025 0.103 -- 
     
13. Board Independence 0.028 0.079 0.111 0.315 0.002 0.004 0.027 -0.299 0.074 0.105 0.096 0.137 -- 
    
14. CEO Duality -0.009 -0.004 -0.100 -0.126 -0.010 -0.007 -0.003 0.008 -0.114 0.030 -0.021 -0.168 0.021 -- 
   
15. Family Ownership* -0.012 -0.038 0.005 0.085 -0.004 0.003 -0.039 0.124 -0.091 -0.007 0.170 -0.196 0.080 0.090 -- 
  
16. Closeness Centrality 0.103 0.152 0.314 0.329 0.018 0.010 0.042 -0.173 0.317 -0.091 0.035 0.270 0.163 -0.163 -0.022 -- 
 
17. Bet. Centrality 0.087 0.133 0.297 0.258 0.020 0.008 0.036 -0.145 0.314 -0.097 0.017 0.275 0.119 -0.166 -0.118 0.970 -- 
Mean 0.25 0.41 3.82 1.99 -0.06 0.01 0.25 0.26 1.37 3.83 2.02 0.43 0.43 0.45 1.17 2.27 1.63 
Standard Deviation 1.16 1.24 2.36 0.44 0.12 0.73 4.34 0.26 1.29 0.47 0.59 0.49 0.22 0.5 1.6 1.35 0.95 
 
n = 16,598 firm year observations (2002-2009); 
* logarithmic transformation; 
Correlation > |.02| significant at p<.05. 
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TABLE 4.2: Results of Panel Data Negative Binomial Estimation on New Domestic Projects (I) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control variables           
Firm size 0.39*** 0.02 0.38*** 0.02 0.38*** 0.02 0.38*** 0.02 0.38*** 0.02 
Board Size 0.39*** 0.07 0.32*** 0.07 0.33*** 0.07 0.33*** 0.07 0.34*** 0.07 
Prior Performance -3.27*** 0.86 -3.44*** 0.89 -3.42*** 0.89 -3.40*** 0.90 -3.38*** 0.90 
R&D Intensity -0.06 0.30 -0.05 0.25 -0.05 0.23 -0.05 0.24 -0.05 0.22 
Advertising Intensity 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
CEO Relatives 0.72*** 0.12 0.85*** 0.13 0.81*** 0.13 0.88*** 0.13 0.84*** 0.13 
Institutional Ownership 0.13*** 0.03 0.13*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.13*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 
Public Ownership -0.16** 0.06 -0.14** 0.06 -0.14** 0.06 -0.14** 0.06 -0.14** 0.06 
Average Tenure -0.30*** 0.05 -0.28*** 0.05 -0.28*** 0.05 -0.29*** 0.05 -0.28*** 0.05 
Group Affiliation 0.05 0.06 -0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.07 
Main Effects           
Board Independence   0.34** 0.14 0.46** 0.15 1.26*** 0.32 1.37*** 0.32 
CEO Duality   -0.06 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.06 0.06 
Family Ownership   -0.09*** 0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.09*** 0.02 -0.01 0.04 
Closeness Centrality   0.10*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.03 0.27*** 0.06 0.26*** 0.06 
Interactions           
BI x Family Ownership     -0.16* 0.08   -0.16* 0.08 
BI x Closeness Centrality       -0.38*** 0.12 -0.38*** 0.12 
Log Likelihood
 
 -7849.27 -7827.01 -7824.84 -7821.61 -7819.52 
Wald χ2  1251.91*** 1276.50*** 1283.47*** 1279.22*** 1286.21*** 
∆ χ2   24.59*** 6.97*** 2.72*** 9.71*** 
 
n = 16,598 firm-year observations. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; (all two-tailed tests)  
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TABLE 4.3: Results of Panel Data Negative Binomial Estimation on New Domestic Projects (II) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control variables           
Firm size 0.39*** 0.02 0.38*** 0.02 0.38*** 0.02 0.38*** 0.02 0.38*** 0.02 
Board Size 0.39*** 0.07 0.35*** 0.07 0.35*** 0.07 0.36*** 0.07 0.36*** 0.07 
Prior Performance -3.27*** 0.86 -3.47*** 0.90 -3.45*** 0.90 -3.45*** 0.90 -3.43*** 0.90 
R&D Intensity -0.06 0.30 -0.05 0.25 -0.05 0.23 -0.05 0.25 -0.05 0.23 
Advertising Intensity 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
CEO Relatives 0.72*** 0.12 0.84*** 0.13 0.80*** 0.13 0.85*** 0.13 0.81*** 0.13 
Institutional Ownership 0.13*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 
Public Ownership -0.16 0.06 -0.14* 0.06 -0.14* 0.06 -0.14* 0.06 -0.13* 0.06 
Average Tenure -0.30*** 0.05 -0.28*** 0.05 -0.28*** 0.05 -0.28*** 0.05 -0.28*** 0.05 
Group Affiliation 0.05 0.06 -0.09 0.07 -0.08 0.07 -0.09 0.07 -0.08 0.07 
Main Effects           
Board Independence   0.34** 0.14 0.45** 0.15 0.93** 0.34 1.11** 0.35 
CEO Duality   -0.06 0.06 -0.05 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.06 0.06 
Family Ownership   -0.07*** 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.07*** 0.02 0.00 0.04 
Betweenness Centrality   0.22*** 0.04 0.21*** 0.04 0.35*** 0.08 0.36*** 0.08 
Interactions           
BI x Family Ownership     -0.14* 0.08   -0.16* 0.08 
BI x Betweenness Centrality       -0.32* 0.16 -0.35* 0.17 
Total R
2 
 -7849.27 -7819.31 -7817.56 -7817.47 -7815.36 
Wald χ2  1251.91*** 1274.20*** 1280.22*** 1279.96*** 1286.12*** 
∆ χ2   22.29*** 6.02*** 5.76*** 11.92*** 
 
n = 16598 firm-year observations. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; (all two-tailed tests)
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Hypothesis 3a predicts that firms that are more central in the network of other 
firms based on director interlocks, are more likely to start a new domestic venture.  
The coefficient on closeness centrality is positive and significant (Table 4.2, Model 2: 
β = 0.10, p < .001).  Likewise, the coefficient on betweenness centrality is also 
positive and significant (Table 4.3, Model 2: β = 0.22, p < .001).  H3a is supported.  
With respect to family ownership, Hypothesis 4a predicts a negative relationship 
between family ownership and new domestic ventures.  The coefficient on family 
ownership is negative and significant (Table 4.2, Model 2: β = -0.09, p < .001), giving 
support to H4a. 
Coming to the contingency effects, Hypothesis 5a predicts that the positive 
relationship between board independence and new domestic ventures is weakened if a 
firm has a higher level of family ownership.  The coefficient on the interaction term 
between board independence and family ownership is negative and significant (Table 
4.2, Model 3: β = -0.16, p < .05), giving support to H5a.  Hypothesis 6a predicts that 
the positive relationship between network centrality and new domestic ventures is 
weakened if a firm has more independent board members.  The coefficient on the 
interaction term between board independence and centrality measures is negative and 
significant (Table 4.2, Model 3: β = -0.38, p < .001; Table 4.3, Model 3: β = -0.32, p 
< .05), giving support to H6a. 
Growth in the Foreign Markets 
Next I discuss the results of the model predicting foreign investments.  Tables 4.4 
and 4.5 present the results of panel data GLS estimation with foreign investments as 
the dependent variable.  As in the previous case, I use closeness centrality in Table 




TABLE 4.4: Results of Random Effects GLS Estimation on Foreign Investments (I) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control variables           
Firm size 0.13*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 
Board Size 0.30*** 0.02 0.19*** 0.03 0.19*** 0.03 0.19*** 0.03 0.19*** 0.03 
Prior Performance -0.95** 0.34 -0.92** 0.34 -0.93** 0.34 -0.92** 0.34 -0.93** 0.34 
R&D Intensity 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Advertising Intensity 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 
CEO Relatives 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 
Institutional Ownership 0.12*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.01 
Public Ownership 0.06** 0.02 0.07** 0.02 0.07** 0.02 0.07** 0.02 0.06** 0.02 
Average Tenure 0.06*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Group Affiliation 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Main Effects           
Board Independence   0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.26 0.06 -0.28 0.07 
CEO Duality   0.16*** 0.05 0.16*** 0.05 0.15** 0.05 0.15** 0.05 
Family Ownership   0.01* 0.00 -0.02** 0.01 0.01** 0.00 -0.02* 0.01 
Closeness Centrality   0.14*** 0.01 0.14*** 0.01 0.05** 0.02 0.06** 0.02 
Interactions           
BI x Family Ownership     0.07*** 0.02   0.06*** 0.02 
BI x Closeness Centrality       0.16*** 0.03 0.15*** 0.03 
Total R
2 
 0.125 0.123 0.124 0.127 0.127 
Wald χ2  1850.18*** 1995.20*** 2013.91*** 2037.36*** 2051.02*** 
∆ χ2   145.02*** 18.71*** 42.16*** 55.82*** 
 
n = 16598 firm-year observations. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; (all two-tailed tests)  
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TABLE 4.5: Results of Random Effects GLS Estimation on Foreign Investments (II) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control variables           
Firm size 0.13*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 
Board Size 0.30*** 0.02 0.27*** 0.02 0.27*** 0.02 0.27*** 0.02 0.26*** 0.02 
Prior Performance -0.95** 0.34 -0.93** 0.34 -0.94** 0.34 -0.92** 0.34 -0.94** 0.34 
R&D Intensity 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Advertising Intensity 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 
CEO Relatives 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 
Institutional Ownership 0.12*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 
Public Ownership 0.06* 0.02 0.06* 0.02 0.06* 0.02 0.06* 0.02 0.06* 0.02 
Average Tenure 0.06* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.05* 0.02 0.05* 0.02 
Group Affiliation 0.08 0.05 0.12* 0.05 0.12* 0.05 0.12* 0.05 0.12* 0.05 
Main Effects           
Board Independence   0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.29*** 0.07 -0.34*** 0.07 
CEO Duality   0.13** 0.05 0.13** 0.05 0.13** 0.05 0.13** 0.05 
Family Ownership   0.02*** 0.00 -0.02* 0.01 0.02*** 0.00 -0.02 0.01 
Betweenness Centrality   0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.09*** 0.02 -0.08*** 0.02 
Interactions           
BI x Family Ownership     0.08*** 0.02   0.08*** .02 
BI x Betweenness Centrality       0.22*** 0.03 0.22*** 0.03 
Total R
2 
 0.125 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.129 
Wald χ2  1850.18*** 1878.89*** 1898.94*** 1925.28*** 1946.00*** 
∆ χ2   28.61*** 20.05*** 46.39*** 67.11*** 
 
n = 16598 firm-year observations. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; (all two-tailed tests)
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Hypothesis 1b predicts a positive relationship between board independence 
and new foreign investments.  The coefficient on board independence is positive, but 
insignificant.  H1b is rejected. Hypothesis 2b predicts a positive relationship 
between CEO duality and new foreign investments.  The coefficient on CEO duality 
is positive and significant (Table 4.4, Model 2: β = 0.16, p < .001), giving support to 
H2b.  Hypothesis 3b predicts that firms that are more central in the network of other 
firms based on director interlocks, are more likely to undertake new foreign 
investments.  The coefficient on closeness centrality is positive and significant 
(Table 4.4, Model 2: β = 0.14, p < .001).  The coefficient on betweenness centrality 
in Table 4.5 is however not significant.  Thus, H3b is only partially supported.  
With respect to family ownership, Hypothesis 4b predicts a positive relationship 
between family ownership and new foreign investments.  The coefficient on family 
ownership is positive and significant (Table 4.4, Model 2: β = 0.01, p < .05), giving 
support to H4b. 
Next I discuss the contingency effects.  Hypothesis 5b predicts that the 
positive relationship between board independence and foreign investments is 
strengthened if a firm has a higher level of family ownership.  The coefficient on the 
interaction term between board independence and family ownership is positive and 
significant (Table 4.4, Model 3: β = 0.07, p < .001), giving support to H5b.  
Hypothesis 6b predicts that the positive relationship between network centrality and 
foreign investments is weakened if a firm has more independent board members.  
Contrary to this, the coefficient on the interaction term between board independence 
and centrality measures is positive and significant (Table 4.4, Model 3: β = 0.16, p 
< .001; Table 4.5, Model 3: β = 0.22, p < .001). H6b is not supported.  Table 4.6 
presents a summary of the hypotheses and findings of this chapter. 
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Table 4.6: Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
 
New Domestic Ventures Foreign Investments 
 
Predicted Result Predicted Result 
Board Independence + Supported + Not Supported 
CEO Duality + Not Supported + Supported 
Network Centrality + Supported + Supported 
Family Ownership - Supported + Supported 
Family Ownership X BI - Supported + Supported 
Network Centrality X BI - Supported - Not Supported 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
I examine the linkages between different governance mechanisms and growth 
strategies.  I examine two strategies – growth through new domestic ventures and 
growth through new foreign investments.  Consistent with my arguments in Chapter 
3, I propose that boards, that are structured keeping in view the resource dependence 
role, are more helpful in pursuing growth strategies.  I propose that independent 
board members are more helpful in resource provisioning role, and therefore help 
firms pursue growth through new domestic ventures or new foreign investments. At 
the same time, CEO duality minimizes conflict in decision making and helps pursue 
growth strategies.  I also argue that firms, which are more central in the network of 
other firms, are in a better position to make use of growth strategies, both in the 
domestic markets and international markets.  With respect to family ownership, I 
argue that firms with higher family ownership are more likely to pursue growth 
through international expansion and less likely to pursue growth through new 
domestic ventures.   
 I further propose that board independence interacts with family ownership 
and network centrality in affecting a firm‘s decision to pursue growth strategies.  I 
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argue that the positive relationship between board independence and new domestic 
ventures is weakened if a firm has a higher level of family ownership. With respect to 
international expansion, I argue that the positive relationship between board 
independence and foreign investments is strengthened if a firm has a higher level of 
family ownership.  Finally, I argue that network relationships are more beneficial in 
supporting growth strategies if such relationships are due to internal members than if 
they are due to independent members.   
 Before I discuss the implications of this research, its limitations need to be 
noted.  First, the study analyzes growth strategies at an aggregate level.  For 
example, foreign investments of a firm may be for establishing wholly owned 
subsidiaries or for acquisitions.  Furthermore, the motives for foreign investment 
may vary from market exploration to market exploitation.  By looking at the 
aggregate amount of foreign investment, I am not able to decipher different motives 
that firms have for foreign expansion.  Future research can examine the growth 
strategies at a more disaggregated level and thereby decipher how the motives of 
board of directors and owners match with the motives of a firm in pursuing growth 
strategies.  Second, I examine only two board characteristics – board independence 
and CEO duality.  Future research can look at the characteristics of individual board 
members, and link them to a firm‘s growth strategies.  Finally, this research is based 
on a sample of large publicly listed firms, and may not apply to smaller, unlisted firms 
that operate under different constraints. 
 This study has important implications for theory and practice.  First and 
foremost, I show that board of directors affects the growth strategies that emerging 
market firms pursue.  Thus boards in emerging market firms are not just for name‘s 
sake, but have an important role to play in the growth of firms.  Independent board 
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members help emerging market firms pursue growth strategies through their resource 
provisioning and advisory role, even though the effectiveness of independent 
members in the monitoring role may be limited.  Thus firms in the growth stage 
should appoint more independent members on their boards.  This finding supports 
the view that the efficacy of governance arrangements is dependent on the broader 
institutional context in which firms operate (Aguilera et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2008).  
This finding also corroborates my arguments that the resource dependence role of 
board is more important than the monitoring role in the case of emerging markets. 
 Even though I did not hypothesize a relationship between group affiliation 
and growth strategies, the insignificant effect of group affiliation merits some 
discussion.  The insignificant relationship between group affiliation and growth 
strategies is contrary to the arguments that groups continue to play an important role 
in emerging markets (Khanna & Yahef, 2005).  As the institutional environment is 
evolving, the importance of group affiliation is diminishing in emerging markets (Lee, 
Peng & Lee, 2008).  However, I do find that network resources matter for emerging 
market firms.  Firms that are more central in the network created by board members 
are more likely to pursue growth strategies.  Furthermore, the benefits of network 
resources in pursuing growth strategies in the domestic markets are greater if firms 
have more internal members.  With respect to family ownership, my findings suggest 
that family owners have different preferences when it comes to growth through 
international expansion and growth through domestic expansion.  As Zahra (2003) 
suggested, the longer time horizon of family owners helps them pursue strategies that 
give higher returns in the long run.   
 In conclusion, this study suggests that governance mechanisms such as board 
composition and ownership structure of a firm affect its growth strategies.  
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Independent board members help through resource provisioning and advisory role in 
pursuing growth strategies.  Boards also help firms by positioning them in the 
network of other firms, which helps in opportunity identification and perusal.  
Finally, family owners, with their longer time horizon, prefer growth through 









The linkage between corporate governance and firm performance is one of the most 
debated issues in governance literature.  Even though there is no conclusive evidence 
on how governance affects performance, scholars and policy makers continue to 
prescribe a ―one size fits all‖ model of corporate governance (Coles et al., 2008).  
Recently, scholars have begun to question the assumptions of ―one size fits all‖ model, 
by suggesting that there are important contextual contingencies, which must be taken 
into account to understand the effectiveness of different governance mechanisms 
(Aguilera et al., 2008). In this chapter, I revisit the governance-performance linkage 
by using a multi-theoretic approach that takes into account the potential for contextual 
variation in the efficacy of governance practices.  
 The board of directors and ownership structure are two important firm level 
governance mechanisms.  Extant literature identifies two important functions of a 
board – monitoring and control, and resource provision and advice.  Two theoretical 
streams – agency theory and resource dependence – have been the mainstays of 
research on the linkage between board of directors and firm performance (Aguilera et 
al., 2008).  Both these theories make similar predictions about the relationship 
between board structure and firm performance, even though the mechanisms through 
which boards affect firm performance differ.  This is reflected in the equivocal 
empirical findings about the board structure and firm performance relationship 
(Dalton et al., 1998).  
 Agency theory based arguments, which focus on minimizing the 
opportunistic behavior of agents, suggest that the primary function of the board is to 
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monitor and control the managers.  A separation of the role of board chair and CEO, 
and presence of more independent directors in the board help in the monitoring and 
control function of the board.  Therefore firms that have more independent boards 
should outperform those that have less independent boards.  Resource dependence 
theory, on the other hand suggests that the primary function of the board is that of 
resource acquisition.  Board members work as a bridge between a firm and its 
external environment that provides resources needed for a firm‘s survival and success.  
A greater representation of well-connected members in the boards, who understand 
the internal function of the firm should help the firm acquire resources from the 
external environment (Carpenter & Westphal 2001; Hillman et al., 2000), which in 
turn should improve firm performance (Boyd, 1990; Dalton et al., 1999).  While 
both these theories make similar predictions, the mechanism through which boards 
affect firm performance differ. 
 In this essay, I propose that the relative importance of resource dependence 
and monitoring roles varies depending on the presence of other governance 
mechanisms.  Firms in emerging markets such as India have a high degree of family 
involvement through family ownership (Carney, 2005).  Presence of family 
ownership minimizes the chances of traditional principal-agent conflict (Schulze et al., 
2001).  However, it creates a different type of agency problem wherein the majority 
shareholders misappropriate the firm value at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  Under this scenario, independent board members will not 
be able to perform the monitoring role, given that board members are representatives 
of the shareholders.  In order to identify the mechanism through which board 
members affect firm performance, we need to structure an investigation that examines 
the effect of board structure in conjunction with the presence of other governance 
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mechanisms and network relationships.  
 To address the above noted issues, I examine the individual and joint effects 
of board structure, ownership structure and network relationships that board members 
create on firm performance.  I argue that the presence of an independent board is 
positively related to firm performance as independent board members help in 
minimizing the traditional agency problems faced by emerging market firms.  
Likewise, presence of family ownership is positively related to firm performance as 
family ownership minimizes the traditional agency problems that firms may face.  
Boards also enhance firm performance by creating network ties which help in getting 
access to resources and knowledge from the external environment.  I further examine 
the contingencies that affect the relationship between board independence and firm 
performance.  I argue that in the presence of other governance mechanisms, such as 
high family ownership which minimizes traditional agency problems, the importance 
of board independence reduces.  Furthermore, in the resource provisioning role that 
board members accomplish through their ties with the external environment, internal 
members are more beneficial than external members.   
 This essay contributes to the extant literature in three ways.  First, I argue 
that boards have multiple roles, the relative importance of these roles as well as the 
efficacy of a board in performing these roles, may vary depending on the presence of 
other governance mechanisms.  An independent board may be able to minimize the 
traditional agency problems, but is less effective in controlling the unique 
principal-principal conflict in the case of emerging market firms.  Second, I examine 
the role of network relationships that boards create through director interlocks and the 
importance of these relationships in establishing linkages between a firm and its 
external environment.  Finally, I examine the contingencies that affect the board 
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independence – firm performance relationship.  In doing so, I identify the conditions 
under which the relative importance of monitoring and resource dependence roles of 
the boards vary.  Results, based on a sample of about 2,689 publically listed firms in 
India during 2001-2009 time period, largely support the key arguments of this essay. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Board structure and Firm Performance 
There is a rich body of literature suggesting both a positive and a negative effect of 
board independence on firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998).  The positive effects 
arise due to the monitoring and resource provisioning functions of the board.  The 
negative effects arise due to the inability of independent members to understand the 
complex internal processes of a firm, which limits their monitoring and counsel role.   
As discussed before, emerging market firms face both the traditional 
principal-agent problems as well as unique principal-principal problems (Claessens et 
al., 2000; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Lemmon & Lins, 2003).  The traditional agency 
problems can be minimized by aligning the incentives of the agents with the 
principals, optimizing their risk bearing properties and by effective monitoring of the 
agents (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Zahra, 1996).  However, the 
effectiveness of these governance solutions is dependent on the presence of 
well-developed institutions and rule-based governance context, which many emerging 
markets lack.  In addition, weak governance environment accentuates the 
principal-principal agency conflict as there are inadequate safeguards to protect the 
interests of minority shareholders (Cho, 1999).   
Presence of independent members on the boards offers partial solution to the 
agency problems that emerging market firms face.  While independent members may 
not have much control over the decisions made by majority shareholders (Dharwadkar 
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et al., 2000), they do help in monitoring the managers in case conflicts arise between 
owners and managers.  In some cases, it has been observed that independent 
members even go against the majority shareholders who may have appointed them.  
For example, in one of the largest corporate scandals witnessed in the corporate 
history of India, the owner-manager of Satyam Corporation defrauded the firm for 
twelve billion USD (Gaur & Kohli, 2011).  While the independent members were 
not able to stop the scandal from taking place, they were the ones who unearthed the 
scandal.  Therefore, presence of independent members on the board should enhance 
firm performance.    
 In addition to the monitoring role, independent members also help in 
developing linkages with the external environment.  They also help in the counseling 
role as they bring an outsider‘s perspective in the board meetings and enrich the 
discussions (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Gales & Kesner, 1994).  Given that 
emerging economy firms are relatively small in size and less complex as compared to 
firms in developed economies, the internal operations of emerging economy firms are 
not likely to be too complex for external directors to understand and advice.  
Scholars have argued that more complex firms, such as those with a high level of 
technological intensity, may require more internal members, who can understand the 
nature of the business and accordingly provide counsel (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; 
Baysinger, Kosnick, & Turk, 1991; Boyd, 1994).  This is typically not the case with 
emerging economy firms.  Consequently, I expect independent board members to 
enhance firm performance. 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): The greater the presence of independent 
members on a board, the better is the firm performance. 
 
In addition to the presence of independent members on the board, an important 
component in the effectiveness of a board is the role played by the board chair.  
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Board chairs appoint board members to different committees such as audit committee 
and appointment and promotion committee.  Board chairs also have the authority to 
call a meeting of the board members and finalize the agenda for board meetings.  A 
board cannot function in an independent manner unless the roles of CEO and board 
chair are assumed by different individuals (de Kluyver, 2009). 
In addition to compromising on the independent role of the board, CEO 
duality also limits the effectiveness of board in the advisory role.  When the two 
positions are occupied by the same person, the firm loses an important voice of 
dissent.  Scholars have argued that management is a shared effort by the dominant 
coalition in an organization, and that organizational behavior is influenced 
collectively, instead of resulting from the actions of any single actor (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). A coalition of decision makers who bring alternate perspectives is 
likely to be more effective in problem solving as diverse groups bring more resources 
and capabilities than homogeneous groups (Foss, Klein, Jor & Mahoney, 2008). 
Research has shown that group decision making is more effective when alternate 
viewpoints are brought to the discussion (Bilimoria & Wheeler, 2000).  CEO duality 
may not only reduce an additional voice in decision making, but also make others 
silent due to the concentration of power in one hand.  Consequently, it is not 
surprising that most governance codes advocate that the role of board chair be 
separated from the role of CEO (Otten, 2007).  Based on the above discussion, I 
expect a negative effect of CEO duality on firm performance. 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Firms that have CEO duality have inferior 
performance than firms in which CEO and board chair positions are 
occupied by different people. 
 
I test another variant of the above by arguing that firms may still have CEO 
duality if the board chair is a relative of the CEO.  Thus presence of board chairs 
115 
 
who are relatives of the CEO would lead to similar problems as in the case of CEO 
duality. 
Family Ownership and Firm Performance 
Extant literature suggests that certain configurations of ownership structure may 
minimize the traditional agency problems that firms face.  For example, several 
studies find that firms with large, concentrated shareholding patterns outperform those 
with dispersed ownership patterns (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; Shleifer & Vishney, 
1986; Thomsen & Pederson, 2000).  Owners with concentrated shareholdings have 
both the incentive and ability to monitor and discipline the managers.  These 
arguments, however apply to firms in which there is a separation of ownership and 
management.  La Porta et al. (1999) argue that in many countries, it is common to 
have family members as both the owners and the managers.  While involvement of 
families as owners as well as managers has been observed in both developed and 
developing countries (La Porta et al., 1999; Thomsen & Pederson, 2000), it is more 
common in the case of emerging market firms (Carney, 2005; Chang, 2003; Whyte, 
1996).   
 There are two views on how family ownership may affect firm performance.  
Some scholars have argued that the presence of family ownership is detrimental for 
firm performance as family ownership leads to misappropriation of minority 
shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983), firms becoming risk averse and under 
investment (Thomsen & Pederson, 2000).  This view is also reflected in the 
sociology stream, where scholars consider family control to be a drag on economic 
development (Fukuyama, 1995).  Schulze et al. (2001) argue that family firms are 
plagued with the problems of internal conflicts and self-governance, which hinders 
their ability to develop capabilities needed to compete in technologically advanced 
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industries.   
 The counter view suggests that family ownership leads to more effective 
management as it minimizes the traditional agency problems (Morck, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1988), and allows for more effective control of a firm‘s strategies and 
operations (Carney, 2005).  Carney (2005) identifies three characteristics of family 
governance – parsimony, personalism, and particularism – that make it superior to 
other forms of governance such as managerial governance.  Family firms can make a 
better use of the opportunities available in the external environment as the decision 
making is less bureaucratic and informal.  The advantages associated with 
family-governance are particularly important in the case of emerging markets.  It has 
been argued that the level of environmental munificence is lower in emerging markets, 
making it difficult for firms to obtain resources from the external environment 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).  The characteristics of parsimony and personalism mean 
that firms can manage their resources more efficiently in scarce environment.  
Personalism and particularism also allow for developing social capital and ties with 
the external environment that are crucial for success in emerging markets.  
Consistent with this, there is a rich body of literature on the benefits associated with 
family based governance models such as business groups in emerging markets 
(Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, b).   
 While firms with family ownership enjoy the benefits discussed above, the 
problems of family based governance, such as under investment and risk averse 
decision making are not very serious in the case of emerging markets.  In fact, these 
problems become advantages in the case of emerging markets as most emerging 
market firms are resource constrained (Gaur & Kumar, 2010) and need to make a 
prudent use of the available resources.  Consequently, I expect a positive effect of 
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family ownership on the performance of emerging market firms. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Family ownership is positively related to firm 
performance in emerging markets. 
 
Network Effects and Firm Performance 
Boards have multiple roles.  In addition to the monitoring role, boards also help 
firms develop linkages with the external environment through director networks 
(Korn/Ferry, 1999).  Much of the scholarly effort on network effects has focused on 
the strategic behavior of firms such as alliance formation (Gulati, 1998) or on the 
information effects of specific type of ties (Stuart, 2000).  Not much scholarly effort 
has been devoted to explain ―whether and how the structural characteristics of 
organizational networks affect performance differences among firms‖ (Gulati et al., 
2002: 288).  The studies that focus on the performance consequences of networks 
only examine the director interlocks between the participating firms (and not the 
structural characteristics of a network) and how the same leads to reduced uncertainty 
and increased mutual performance of the firms that are connected through the 
interlocks (Lang & Lockhart, 1990).  In this section, I focus on the mechanism 
through which board networks benefit firms. 
 Resource dependence theory has been the main theoretical lens through 
which scholars have examined the effect of director networks on firm strategy and 
performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) identify four 
ways through which board members‘ external ties help the focal firm.  First, board 
members with more ties help in advising and counseling the focal firm through their 
superior expertise and experience in specific areas that they represent (Gales & 
Kesner, 1994; Westphal, 1999).  Second, external ties through board members help 
the focal organization in gaining legitimacy and reputation (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 
2001; Daily & Schwenk, 1996; Hambrick & D‘Aveni, 1992).  Third, external ties 
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provide the focal firms with conduits of information exchange with the external 
environment (Burt, 1980; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Useem, 1994).  Finally, the 
resource provision role of board can be more effectively utilized if a focal firm has 
more connections with the external environment.  The above network related 
advantages can be grouped in three categories - financial resources (Ingram & Inman, 
1996; Keister, 1998), institutional resources (Baum & Oliver, 1991) and knowledge 
related resources (Ingram & Inman, 1996)
1
. 
In an emerging economy such as India, the markets for products, labor and 
capital are not well developed (Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Khanna & Palepu, 1999).  
Emerging market firms cannot secure access to different factors of production from 
the market the way Western firms do.  In order to secure access to raw materials or 
markets for their output, firms need connections with other firms in the downstream 
or upstream industries.  Likewise, firms may need connections with leading banks 
and other financial institutions in order to gain access to capital.  The external ties 
that board members provide, help in linking the firm to the external environment and 
gain access to critical resources (Keister, 1998).  In an analysis of 40 largest Chinese 
business groups and their 535 member affiliates, Keister (1998) found that the 
affiliates reported higher financial performance when they were able to access 
financial resources through informal ways.   
Not all firms belonging to a network derive the same benefits.  The extent to 
which firms can benefit from network relationships depends on how central they are 
in a given network.  Network centrality refers to the degree to which a firm occupies 
a strategically important position in a network (Freeman, 1979).  Scholars have 
found network centrality of a firm to be positively associated with its capability to 
                                               
1 See Gulati, Dialdin and Wang (2002) for a review of network related benefits. 
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enter into new alliances (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1999).  Being central in a 
network also means that the focal firm can get a more rapid access to information and 
avail more opportunities than other firms in the network (Gulati, 1999).  Consistent 
with these studies and based on the resource dependence view, I argue that network 
centrality provides more financial, institutional and knowledge resources to the focal 
firm, and thereby enhances its performance. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The greater the level of network centrality 
(closeness and betweenness) of a firm, the better is its performance.  
 
The Contingent Value of Board Structure 
Having established the positive benefits of the monitoring and resource dependence 
roles of a board, I examine the conditions under which the relative importance of 
board independence varies.  I examine two contingencies, family ownership and 
network effects, under which the presence of independent members on a board is less 
beneficial than the presence of internal members. 
Interaction between board independence and family ownership 
As discussed before, emerging market firms face both the traditional, principal-agent 
agency problems (although to a much reduced extent), as well as the unique, 
principal-principal agency problems.  Having more independent board members 
helps in minimizing the principal-agent agency problems, but not the 
principal-principal agency problems.  At the same time, presence of family 
ownership reduces the principal-agent problems due to direct involvement of family 
members in running the organization.  In fact, some scholars have argued that in the 
case of family owner-managed firms, principal-agent conflicts may be absent 
altogether (Carney, 2005). 
 The monitoring role of independent members becomes less relevant in the 
situations when principal-agent conflict is less severe.  On the other hand, having 
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more internal people in the board of a family controlled firm benefits the firm as these 
people share the vision and outlook of the owners (James, 1999).  Internal people 
have a more nuanced understanding of not only firm level issues, but also the 
dynamics in the controlling family.  As a result, they can understand the decisions 
taken by the owner-managers in proper perspective, something which would not be 
possible for an external person, who may just employ rational criteria to assess the 
suitability of a strategic decision.  Some of the benefits of family control that we 
discussed earlier, such as parsimony, personalism and particularism, can be better 
realized if there is no unwanted interference in running the affairs of a firm.  
Presence of independent members in firms with high family ownership may inhibit 
the owner-managers to derive the benefits from parsimony and personalism, which 
are the source of competitive advantage for these firms.  Accordingly, I expect a 
negative interaction effect between board independence and family ownership in 
affecting firm performance. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): There is a negative interaction between family 
ownership and board independence such that the positive relationship 
between family ownership and firm performance is weakened if a firm 
has more independent board members. 
 
Interaction between board independence and network centrality 
As I argued in Chapter 4, the network benefits that firms in emerging markets derive 
are more important if the network linkages originate through internal board members 
than if they originate through independent board members (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; 
Gales & Kesner, 1994).  This is counter intuitive to the dominant logic that the 
independent members work as a bridge between a firm and  the environment.  
There are at least two reasons why this dominant logic that we observe in the case of 
developed market firms may not be true in the case of emerging markets. 
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 First, even in the developed market contexts, the resource provisioning role is 
not limited to external board members.  Recognizing the importance of internal 
members in the resource provisioning role, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990: 77) argue 
that ―insiders, because they are participants in the decision processes, have access to 
information that is relevant to assessing the strategic desirability of initiatives‖.  In 
the case of emerging market firms, insider board members have social, economic and 
emotional ties with the organizations in which they serve (Gomez-Mejia, 
Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003).  These people often rise through the ranks and 
command a high level of social capital within the organization in emerging markets.  
The relationships they have with the firm are not merely contractual; rather they 
represent the complex social structure that we observe at a more macro level in 
emerging markets (Encarnation, 1989; Granovetter, 1994).  Insiders are also more 
familiar with the internal resource configurations, strategic priorities, and resource 
requirements of the firm with which they are associated (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 
1990).  Consequently, the linkages that the insiders create with the external 
environment are not only more relevant, but also more beneficial for the focal firm. 
 Second, and more importantly, unlike developed countries, where there is a 
flourishing market for independent directors, there is an acute scarcity of independent 
directors in emerging markets such as India.  This is a consequence of the boarder 
issue of underdeveloped institutional environment in emerging markets.  Khanna and 
Palepu (1999b) argue that emerging markets lack specialized market intermediaries 
that are taken for granted in developed markets.  Several other scholars have raised 
the issue of absence of skilled professionals and market intermediaries in emerging 
markets such as China (Qian, 1995), Russia (Frydman, Phelps, Rapaczynski, & 
Shleifer, 1993), and Eastern Europe (Rapaczynski, 1996).  As I argued before, 
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emerging market firms employ independent directors more as a ceremonial adoption 
of the corporate governance codes
2
.  The limited availability of qualified and 
competent independent directors would mean that the quality of ties they bring to the 
firms are not as good as those created by internal members.  Thus, in the case of 
emerging market firms, the linkages that are created by independent directors are less 
beneficial than the linkages that are created by internal board members.  Accordingly, 
I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): There is a negative interaction between network 
centrality and board independence such that the positive relationship 
between network centrality and firm performance is weakened if a firm 
has more independent board members. 
 
Figure 5.1 presents an overview of these hypotheses.
                                               
2 Following the corporate governance scandal of Satyam Corporation, about 115 independent directors resigned 
from the board of publicly listed corporation in India within a month after the scandal was unearthed. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
Sample  
The base sample for this essay is the same as I used in the previous two essays 
(Chapters 3 and 4).  The base sample comprises longitudinal data on 2689 publicly 
listed firms for 2001-2009.  In the previous two essays, I lose one year of 
observation after I lag the explanatory variables by one year.  In this essay, I have 
data on the dependent variables (firm performance) for 2010, so I do not lose any 
observation because of lagging.  The final sample comprises 17,967 firm-year 
observations over nine years from 2002 to 2010. 
Variables 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable in this study is firm performance. I use 
ROA (return on assets) as an indicator of firm performance, measured as a ratio of net 
profit of a firm to its total assets. 
Explanatory variables.  The key explanatory variables in this study are related to 
board structure, ownership structure and network effects.  I examine board structure 
through two variables – board independence, and CEO duality.  Board independence 
is the ratio of the independent directors to the total number of directors.  I measure 
CEO duality by a binary variable, which takes a value of one if the CEO and board 
chair positions are occupied by the same person and zero otherwise.  I also adopt a 
stronger definition of CEO duality in robustness tests in which I consider a firm to 
have CEO duality if the board chair is a relative of the CEO, even when these 
positions are occupied by different individuals.  I examine the effect of ownership 
structure through the presence of family ownership, which I measure as a percentage 
of the total ownership.  I use a natural logarithm of this variable as the raw scores are 
highly skewed.  I measure network effect through two measures of network 
centrality – between centrality and closeness centrality.   
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Control variables. I include several firm specific, board specific, and industry 
specific controls.  Firm specific controls include firm size, research and development 
(R&D) intensity, advertising intensity, internationalization, new domestic ventures, 
and group affiliation.  Firm size is a natural logarithm of total assets.  R&D 
intensity and advertising intensity are the ratios of R&D and advertising expenses to 
total sales.  I measure internationalization through a binary variable which takes a 
value of one if a firm exports and zero otherwise.  New domestic ventures are a total 
count of new ventures that a firm has initiated within India in a given year.  I use a 
natural logarithm of this count variable.  I measure group affiliation through an 
indicator variable which takes a value of one if a firm belongs to a business group and 
zero otherwise.  The Prowess database provides information on all these variables. 
The board specific controls include size of the board, average tenure of a 
board member, and presence of CEO relatives in the board.  Board size is a natural 
logarithm of the count of total board members.  Average tenure is a natural 
logarithm of the count of the total number of years for which all the members have 
been on the board divided by the total number of board members.  Finally, I control 
for industry effects through nine indicator variables for 10 primary industries to which 
the firms in my sample belong. 
Analytic Procedure 
I tested the hypotheses using a firm-year unit of analysis over the nine-year period 
from 2002-2010.  With firm-year records for performance analysis, General Linear 
Square (GLS) estimation is an appropriate methodology to test the hypotheses. GLS 
models provide corrections for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
in pooled time series data (Hsiao, 1995).  I use random effects estimation in place of 
fixed effects estimation since some of the variables such as controls for group 
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affiliation and industry membership are static over time.   
 I develop the models in a hierarchical manner. Model 1 includes only the 
control variables. Model 2 adds on to Model 1 and includes the direct effects of board 
structure, family ownership and network centrality measures in addition to the control 
variables. Models 3 and 4 include interactions of board independence with family 
ownership and network centrality measures. Model 6 includes all the main and 
interaction effects.  The betweenness centrality and closeness centrality measures are 
highly correlated.  Therefore I run two different sets of Models 1-5, with the two 
centrality measures. 
RESULTS 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. As can be seen from 
Table 5.1, on an average, boards in Indian firms have seven members, with 44 percent 
of them being identified as independents. In the case of 45% firms in the sample, the 
CEO also occupies the position of the chairman.  Twenty six percent of the board 
members are relatives of the CEO. The mean family ownership in these firms is about 
12 percent.  All the correlations (other than between the two centrality measures) are 
modest suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern in regression models. 
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TABLE 5.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 
1. ROA -- 
              
2. Firm size* -0.06 -- 
             
3. Board Size* 0.07 0.39 -- 
            
4. R&D Intensity -0.01 0.02 0.02 -- 
           
5. Advertising Intensity 0.02 -0.10 0.09 0.00 -- 
          
6. Internationalization* -0.05 0.54 0.24 0.03 -0.07 -- 
         
7. Domestic Ventures 0.08 0.35 0.21 0.02 -0.01 0.14 -- 
        
8. Group Affiliation -0.04 0.35 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.11 -- 
       
9. Average Tenure* -0.02 0.15 0.12 0.00 -0.07 0.15 -0.03 0.11 -- 
      
10. Board Independence 0.04 0.10 0.31 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.09 -- 
     
11. Relatives* -0.06 -0.11 -0.31 0.00 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.13 0.20 -0.30 -- 
    
12. CEO Duality -0.03 -0.09 -0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 -0.16 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -- 
   





0.04 0.29 0.26 0.02 0.04 0.19 0.13 0.28 0.02 0.11 -0.15 -0.16 -0.13 -- 
 
15. Closeness Centrality 0.07 0.31 0.33 0.03 0.04 0.19 0.15 0.27 0.03 0.16 -0.18 -0.16 -0.03 0.97 -- 
Mean 5.34 3.94 7.06 0.00 0.26 0.63 0.26 0.43 7.84 0.44 0.26 0.45 11.53 1.64 2.30 
Standard Deviation 19.54 2.31 3.34 0.07 4.42 0.48 1.18 0.49 4.47 0.21 0.25 0.50 19.93 0.94 1.34 
n = 17,967 firm year observations (2002-2009); 
* Logarithmic transformation; 
Mean and S.D. for all variables other than firm size are based on actual values, correlations for all variables are based on the transformed values 
used in regression analyses;  
Correlation > |.02| significant at p<.05. 
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TABLE 5.2: Results of Random Effects GLS Estimation on Firm Performance (I) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control variables           
Firm size -0.21 0.12 -0.29* 0.13 -0.28* 0.13 -0.29* 0.13 -0.28* 0.13 
Board Size 6.31*** 0.37 3.12*** 0.51 3.16*** 0.51 3.08*** 0.51 3.13*** 0.51 
R&D Intensity -2.07 1.80 -2.29 1.79 -2.27 1.79 -2.31 1.79 -2.29 1.79 
Advertising Intensity -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
Internationalization -1.29** 0.41 -0.96* 0.44 -0.96* 0.44 -0.91* 0.44 -0.92* 0.44 
Domestic Ventures 2.67*** 0.37 2.80*** 0.40 2.81*** 0.40 2.82*** 0.40 2.83*** 0.40 
Group Affiliation -2.32*** 0.60 -2.08** 0.69 -2.09** 0.69 -2.14** 0.70 -2.15** 0.70 
Average Tenure 1.91*** 0.33 1.09** 0.36 1.09** 0.36 1.06** 0.36 1.06** 0.36 
Relatives -2.24* 1.00 -2.21* 1.00 -2.11* 1.00 -2.37** 1.00 -2.27* 1.00 
Main Effects           
Board Independence   2.88** 0.93 5.20*** 1.46 3.37*** 0.95 5.76*** 1.48 
CEO Duality   -1.39* 0.63 -1.37* 0.63 -1.38* 0.63 -1.37* 0.63 
Family Ownership   1.02*** 0.09 1.01*** 0.09 1.30*** 0.16 1.29*** 0.16 
Betweenness Centrality   0.73* 0.31 1.40** 0.45 0.71 0.31 1.40** 0.45 
Interactions           
BI x Family Ownership     -1.55* 0.76   -1.59* 0.76 
BI x Betweenness Centrality       -0.06* 0.03 -0.06* 0.03 
Total R
2 
 0.013 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 
Wald χ2  438.59*** 508.79*** 513.07*** 513.92*** 518.41*** 
∆ χ2   70.20*** 4.28*** 5.13*** 9.62*** 
n = 17,967 firm-year observations. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; (all two-tailed tests) 
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TABLE 5.3: Results of Random Effects GLS Estimation on Firm Performance (II) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control variables           
Firm size -0.21 0.12 -0.34** 0.13 -0.34** 0.13 -0.34** 0.13 -0.34** 0.13 
Board Size 6.31*** 0.37 2.57*** 0.52 2.59*** 0.52 2.55*** 0.52 2.58*** 0.52 
R&D Intensity -2.07 1.80 -2.38 1.79 -2.36 1.79 -2.40 1.79 -2.38 1.79 
Advertising Intensity -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
Internationalization -1.29* 0.41 -0.93* 0.44 -0.93* 0.44 -0.89* 0.44 -0.90* 0.44 
Domestic Ventures 2.67*** 0.37 2.72*** 0.40 2.73*** 0.40 2.74*** 0.40 2.75*** 0.40 
Group Affiliation -2.32*** 0.60 -2.39*** 0.69 -2.42*** 0.69 -2.44*** 0.69 -2.46*** 0.69 
Average Tenure 1.91*** 0.33 0.96** 0.36 0.95** 0.36 0.94** 0.36 0.92** 0.36 
Relatives -2.09* 1.00 -2.07* 1.00 -1.93* 1.00 -2.21* 1.00 -2.08* 1.00 
Main Effects           
Board Independence   2.88** 0.93 5.06*** 1.44 3.33*** 0.95 5.47*** 1.45 
CEO Duality   -1.23* 0.63 -1.19* 0.63 -1.23* 0.63 -1.19* 0.63 
Family Ownership   0.95*** 0.09 0.94*** 0.09 1.20*** 0.16 1.19*** 0.16 
Closeness Centrality   1.17*** 0.22 1.71*** 0.35 1.15*** 0.22 1.68*** 0.35 
Interactions           
BI x Family Ownership     -1.12* 0.56   -1.10* 0.56 
BI x Closeness Centrality       -0.05* 0.03 -0.05* 0.03 
Total R
2 
 0.013 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Wald χ2  438.59*** 532.03*** 536.07*** 536.17*** 540.09*** 
∆ χ2   93.44*** 4.04*** 4.14*** 8.06*** 
n = 17,967 firm-year observations. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; (all two-tailed tests)
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Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present the results of regression analysis with the only 
difference being in the use of centrality measures.  Table 5.2 has betweeness 
centrality while Table 5.3 has closeness centrality as an explanatory variable.  
Hypothesis 1a predicts that board independence is positively associated with firm 
performance.  The coefficient of board independence is positive and significant 
(Table 5.2, Model 2: β = 2.88, p < .01), giving support to H1a.  Hypothesis 1b 
suggests that presence of CEO duality is negatively associated with firm performance.  
The coefficient on CEO duality variable is negative and significant (Table 5.2, Model 
2: β = -1.39, p < .05).  H1b is supported. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms with greater family ownership will 
outperform firms with lower family ownership.  The coefficient on family ownership 
variable is positive and significant (Table 5.2, Model 2: β = 1.02, p < .001), giving 
support to H2.  Hypothesis 3 predicts that firms that are more central in a network 
created by the board members outperform those that are less central in the board 
network.  In Table 5.2, the coefficient on betweenness centrality is positive and 
significant (Model 2: β = 0.73, p < .05).  In Table 5.3, the coefficient on closeness 
centrality is positive and significant (Model 2: β = 1.17, p < .001).  These findings 
provide robust support to the argument that network centrality is positively associated 
with firm performance.  H3 is supported. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 examine the interaction effects of family ownership and 
network centrality on board independence – firm performance relationship.  
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the positive effect of board independence on firm 
performance is weakened if a firm has a high level of family ownership.  The 
coefficient on the interaction term between board independence and family ownership 
is negative and significant (Table 5.2, Model 2: β = -1.55, p < .05) suggesting that in 
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the presence of alternative governance mechanisms such as family ownership, firms 
realize less benefits from board independence.  H4 is supported.  Hypothesis 5 
predicts that the positive effect of network centrality is weakened if firms have more 
independent members on their boards.  Model 4 in Table 5.2 presents the interaction 
between betweenness centrality and board independence (Model 4: β = -0.06, p < .05), 
while Model 4 in Table 5.3 presents the interaction between closeness centrality and 
board independence (Model 4: β = -0.05, p < .05).  In both the tables, the interaction 
coefficient is negative and significant, giving robust support to H5.  Table 5.4 
presents a summary of the hypotheses and findings of this chapter. 





Board Independence + Supported 
CEO Duality - Supported 
Family Ownership + Supported 
Network Centrality + Supported 
Family Ownership X BI - Supported 
Network Centrality X BI - Supported 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
In this chapter I utilize an integration of agency theory with the resource dependence 
view to examine the relationship between board structure and firm performance in the 
case of firms from an important emerging market – India.  I begin with the premise 
that while both resource dependence and monitoring functions are important, but their 
relative importance varies depending on the presence of other governance 
mechanisms and network effects in the case of emerging market firms.    
 More specifically, I argue that the presence of independent directors and the 
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separation of the role of CEO from board chair are positively related to firm 
performance.  Likewise, presence of family ownership is positively related to firm 
performance as family ownership minimizes the traditional agency problems that 
firms may face.  With respect to the network benefits, I argue that firms that are 
more central in a network through board ties outperform those that are less central to a 
network.  Further I propose two contingencies on which board independence – firm 
performance relationship is dependent.  First, I argue that in the presence of other 
governance mechanisms, such as high family ownership which minimizes traditional 
agency problems, the importance of board independence reduces.  Second, I argue 
that in the resource provisioning role that board members accomplish through their 
ties with the external environment, internal members are more beneficial than external 
members.  Empirical findings based on the panel data analysis of 17,967 
observations over a nine year period from 2002 to 2010 support all my hypotheses. 
The two contingency effects I have identified shed some light on the relative 
importance of the monitoring and resource dependence roles of a board.  I 
demonstrate these contingencies by plotting the interaction between board 
independence and family ownership in Figure 5.2, and board independence and 
network centrality in Figure 5.3.  In Figure 5.2, the line representing low board 
independence is steeper than the line representing high board independence, 
suggesting that as the level of family ownership increases the positive benefits from 
board independence diminish.  In other words, the monitoring role of the board 
through independent members becomes less relevant when firms have a high level of 
family ownership.  Likewise, in Figure 5.3, the line representing low board 
independence is much steeper than the line representing high board independence, 
suggesting that network ties become important if they are created by internal directors 
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than if they are created by external directors.  Again, this finding implies that the 
resource provisioning role of the board can be better accomplished through the 
internal directors than the independent ones. 
Figure 5.2 




Low and high values refer to two standard deviations below and above 
the mean value. 
Figure 5.3 
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Even though, I did not explicitly hypothesize a relationship between group 
affiliation and firm performance, the coefficient on the group affiliation variable 
deserves discussion.  I found a negative effect of group affiliation, which is in 
contrast to the conventional wisdom that group affiliation enhances firm performance 
(Chang & Choi, 1988; Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, b).  While I do not disagree with 
the arguments that business groups fill the institutional voids in emerging economies, 
this finding suggests that in the changed environment, not all group affiliated firms 
derive the same benefits.  Some other scholars also found support for this logic and 
showed that group affiliated firms have lower profitability than stand-alone firms, 
with the performance deteriorating more during later periods of institutional transition 
than the earlier periods (Gaur & Delios, 2006).  The network benefits that we 
observe in this essay suggest that the extent to which a group affiliated firm derives 
benefit from being part of a group may depend on where in the group the firm is 
located.  I examined this issue as a secondary analysis and found that group affiliated 
firms that are more important in a group, based on the board network relationships 
within a group, outperform those that are less important in a group. 
Future research should address the limitations of this study.  This study is 
limited to only one emerging market.  While use of one country allows me to control 
for country level variations in the efficacy of governance practices, it also limits the 
generalizability of this study‘s findings.  Future research should, in particular, test 
the key conclusion of this research that internal members are more important in 
resource dependence roles than external members in the case of emerging markets.  
There is some evidence to this effect in the extant literature (Singh & Gaur, 2009), but 
more research is needed before we can make conclusive statements.  I examine only 
one aspect of network relationship – the centrality of a firm in its network.  There are 
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several other issues, such as strength of ties through which firms are connected to 
other firms, structural holes, the network embeddedness that may limit the benefits a 
firm can derive from the network to which it belongs.  Finally, I use only accounting 
based measures of firm performance. Future studies could use Tobin‘s Q or some 
other market based performance measures besides the accounting based performance 
measures.   
This study makes several theoretical contributions.  I argue that boards have 
multiple roles and the importance of these roles is contingent on the presence of other 
governance mechanisms and the network relationships.  The contingent view on 
board composition – firm performance relationship is a meaningful departure from the 
extant literature.  Further, I elaborate on the mechanisms through which board 
members affect firm performance.  Most of the extant literature argues that board 
members help develop linkages with the external environment, but does not explicitly 
test these linkages.  I propose and find that while network relationships are important 
in general, their relative importance increases if the network relationships are 
established through internal directors in the case of emerging economy firms.  The 
approach I adopt in this essay can help reconcile the conflicting findings between 
board structure and firm performance.   
This essay also highlights the nature of agency problems faced by emerging 
economy firms and how these agency problems affect firm governance and 
performance.  I show that while independent members may play a role in monitoring 
the agents on behalf of owners, they are not effective in situations when owners are 
also involved in the management of the firm.  This has important policy implications 
for emerging markets, where policy makers continue to rely on traditional agency 
logic while formulating rules and regulations with respect to firm governance in 
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general and board composition in particular (Otten, 2007).  The fact that corporate 
scandals are getting bigger and more frequent suggests that we need to adopt a fresh 
approach to firm governance.  This study is an initial step in this direction.   
Further, I find family ownership to be a source of strength, rather than 
weakness for emerging market firms.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) find a similar 
positive effect of family ownership on firm performance in the case of US firms, but 
caution that the relationship may not hold in the case of emerging markets due to 
inadequately developed institutional infrastructure.  I show that family governance is 
a source of competitive advantage (Carney, 2005), even in the case of emerging 
markets.  This study also makes important empirical contributions.  The 
longitudinal board network data covering almost the entire population of listed firms 
over nine years that I have used in this essay is a contribution in itself.  To the best of 
my knowledge, this is the first database of such large scale for emerging market firms.  
In this essay, I examine just one of the several issues that one can look at using this 
unique database. 
In conclusion, I examine the efficacy of corporate boards in the case of 
emerging economy firms and identify the contingencies that affect the efficacy of 
different governance arrangements.  This is an initial attempt to develop a more 
holistic understanding of contextual variation in the efficacy of different types of 
boards.  I hope that this research generates more scholarly interest on this topic and 










In this dissertation, I study the antecedents of board structure in the context of an 
emerging market.  I also examine the effect of board composition and ownership 
structure on growth strategies and financial performance of a firm.  I focus on family 
ownership and business group affiliation as important determinants of board structure, 
which I measure by the presence of independent directors and CEO duality.  With 
respect to the growth strategies, I focus on growth through new domestic ventures and 
growth through new foreign investments. 
I examine the antecedents of board structure and strategic and performance 
consequences of firm level governance mechanisms in three essays.  The key 
argument in all the three essays is that boards have multiple roles, and the relative 
importance of these roles varies depending on the external governance context.  In 
the case of emerging markets such as India, the resource dependence and advisory 
role is more important than the monitoring and control role of the board.  In the first 
essay, I argue that presence of family ownership and business group affiliation 
individually and jointly affect the board composition.  In the second essay, I examine 
the individual and joint effects of board structure, network centrality through board 
interlocks and ownership structure on a firm‘s growth strategies.  In the third essay, I 
examine the performance consequences of board structure, network centrality and 
ownership structure.  
I test the theoretical arguments presented in the three essays on a base sample 
of 2,689 publicly listed Indian firms during the period from 2001 to 2009.  The time 
period from 2001 onwards is a period during which there has been a gradual and 
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significant development in corporate governance codes in India, making it a suitable 
time window for empirical validation of my theoretical arguments.  The empirical 
analyses largely support my arguments.  With respect to the board composition, I 
find family ownership to be positively related to presence of independent directors 
and CEO duality.  Firms affiliated to a business group have more independent 
members and a lower incidence of CEO duality.  Group affiliation also interacts with 
family ownership such that a high family ownership in group affiliated firms leads to 
a reduced incidence of having independent board members or an independent person 
acting as board chair. 
Regarding the growth strategies, I find that boards that are structured keeping 
in view the resource dependence role are more helpful in pursuing growth strategies.  
I find that firms having more independent board members and CEO duality are more 
likely to pursue growth through new domestic ventures or new foreign investments.  
Moreover, firms that are more central in the network of other firms based on director 
interlocks are more likely to pursue growth in domestic as well as international 
markets.  I also find that firms with higher family ownership are more likely to 
pursue growth through international expansion and less likely to pursue growth 
through new domestic ventures.   
I further examine how board independence interacts with family ownership 
and network centrality in affecting a firm‘s growth strategies.  I find that a higher 
level of family ownership weakens the positive relationship between board 
independence and new domestic ventures, but strengthens the positive relationship 
between board independence and foreign investments.  In addition, I find that the 
network relationships are more beneficial in supporting growth strategies in the 
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domestic market if such relationships are due to internal members than if they are due 
to independent members.   
Examining the performance consequences of firm level governance, I find that 
family ownership, presence of independent directors and separation of the role of 
CEO from board chair are positively related to firm performance.  Additionally, 
directors also help firms become central in the network of other firms, and firms that 
are more central in the network outperform those that are less central.  Board 
independence also interacts with family ownership and network centrality in affecting 
firm performance.  I find that the positive relationship between board independence 
and firm performance diminishes with an increase in family ownership suggesting the 
family ownership substitutes the need of monitoring by independent members.  At 
the same time, internal members are more beneficial in the resource provisioning role 
as the positive relationship between network centrality and firm performance is 
weakened as the number of independent members in a board increases. 
In summary, I find that the governance context plays an important role in the 
case of emerging market firms.  Both family ownership and business group 
affiliation affect the composition of board, and board composition, in turn affects the 
strategic choices that firms pursue and the financial performance of firms. 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Several contributions emerge from my dissertation.  First, this dissertation proposes 
an integrative, multi-theoretic view on corporate governance.  While a few other 
studies have also taken an integrative perspective on corporate governance, this 
dissertation identifies the conditions that affect the suitability of agency view and 
resource dependence view in governance studies.  I argue that the broader 
institutional environment, in which firms are embedded, plays an important role in the 
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effectiveness of different governance practices.  Governance research needs to 
acknowledge this interdependency between the organizations and environments, in 
order to draw meaningful conclusions about the strategic and performance 
consequences of different governance practices (Aguilera & Jackson 2003; Aguilera 
et al., 2008).   
Second, this dissertation is one of the first to empirically examine the 
antecedents of board structure in the context of an emerging market.  Some scholars 
have proposed theoretical models to examine the antecedents of board structure (e.g., 
Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Raheja, 2005).  However, these theoretical models have 
been developed with a singular focus in increasing the effectiveness of the board in its 
monitoring role.   This dissertation extends these studies by acknowledging the 
multiple roles of the board and suggesting the conditions under which different roles 
assume greater importance. 
Third, a focus on family ownership as a governance mechanism in this 
dissertation contributes to the literature on family firms.  Several scholars have 
suggested that family firms are plagued with various governance problems, which 
hampers effective decision making, and consequently performance of family firms 
(Schulze et al., 2001; Chrisman et al., 2010).  However, I argue and find that family 
governance itself lends significant advantages to a family firm.  Even though family 
firms may not structure their boards in total conformity to agency theory based 
prescriptions in emerging markets, presence of family owners results in firms taking a 
long term view on strategic decision making, and consequently superior firm 
performance.  This dissertation, thus corroborates the view proposed by Carney 
(2005) that family governance itself is a source of competitive advantage for 
emerging market firms. 
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Fourth, in order to supplement my arguments that resource dependence role of 
the board is more important than the monitoring role, I focus on the network benefits 
that board members provide.  According to resource dependence theory, a key 
function of board of directors is to create a bridge with the external environment.  
While many studies have made arguments about the resource provisioning role of 
board members (Hermalin & Weishbach 1998, Kaplan & Minton 1994, Muth & 
Donaldson 1998, Pearce & Zahra 1992), but they did not explicitly test how board 
members fulfill the resource dependence role.  By focusing on director interlocks, 
we can examine how some boards perform the resource dependence role better than 
others.  The empirical findings in this dissertation suggest that those directors who 
make a firm more central in the network of other firms are more beneficial in 
enhancing firm performance. 
Fifth, my focus on growth strategies helps decipher whether board members 
focus on monitoring the managerial actions or in assisting the managers in pursuing 
growth strategies in emerging market firms.  Pursuing growth strategies such as new 
domestic and foreign ventures involves significant risks.  As per the agency view, 
managers would want to pursue these risky diversification strategies for their personal 
motives, while board members try to limit such managerial actions.  However, 
contrary to this, I find that board members assist managers in pursuing growth 
strategies.  This further supports the view that boards primarily function in the 
resource provisioning role in emerging market firms.  It also corroborates the point 
put forth by scholars (Carney, 2005; Dharwadkar et al., 2000) that traditional 
principal-agent conflict is (nearly) absent in emerging market firm. 
Sixth, this dissertation involved a significant data collection effort on 
emerging market firms.  The longitudinal board network covering nine years, and 
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involving more than 20,000 unique directors is a massive data exercise with potential 
to answer many more questions about the role of board networks for firm strategies 
and performance.  Most governance studies are conducted on cross-sectional data, 
which limits the use of advanced methodological tools in governance studies.  Given 
the difficulty in collecting reliable secondary data on such a large scale for emerging 
market firms (Kosova, 2004), the nine-year panel of data utilized in this dissertation is 
a contribution in itself.   
Finally, the findings of my dissertation provide a few directions to policy 
makers and managers.  We have seen a proliferation of governance codes in many 
countries, based primarily on the Cadbury Committee report (1992) or the 
Sarbanes-Oxley act (2002).  Most of these governance codes attempt to prescribe 
―one size fits all‖ model of corporate governance with a disproportionate emphasis on 
the monitoring role of the board.  This is in spite of the fact the empirical studies 
continue to provide equivocal results about the efficacy of board of directors in 
limiting corporate frauds or enhancing firm performance (Dalton & Dalton, 2011).  
The findings of this study suggest that it is time we acknowledge the importance of 
context and develop governance codes keeping in view the local institutional, cultural 
and social environment.  
From managerial perspective, this dissertation shows the importance of 
network resources that board members can provide in strategy execution as well as in 
enhancing the firm performance.  I find that the network resources are more 
important if they come from internal members than if they come from independent 
members.  Firms should encourage their top management team members to develop 
external linkages including membership in other boards.  This finding also suggests 
firms may be able to derive more benefits from the network linkages of independent 
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directors if independent directors have a greater understanding of the internal 
functioning of the firms in which they serve. 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Several extensions to this dissertation are possible.  First, I focused only on family 
ownership and business group affiliation as antecedents of board structure.  While 
the choice of these variables was driven by the need to keep a coherent theoretical 
framework in this dissertation, it would be interesting to theorize and examine the 
effect of other firm-specific and environment-specific characteristics on board 
composition.  Further, I focused only on the presence of independent directors and 
CEO duality to examine board structure.  Future studies could examine the 
determinants of other board attributes such as educational, age, gender and ethnic 
diversity in boards. 
Second, I examined the effect of board structure on firm growth through new 
domestic ventures and new foreign investments.  I focused on these, as the strategic 
choices of diversification in the domestic and foreign markets are especially pertinent 
for emerging economy firms that have been growing at a rapid pace since the year 
2000.  Further, analysis of domestic and international growth strategies helps in 
analyzing the monitoring and resource dependence role of the board.  However, 
these are not the only growth strategies that firms pursue.  Future studies can look at 
alternate growth strategies such as organic growth and growth through acquisitions in 
the domestic market.  Future studies can also differentiate between different types of 
international growth and thereby match the motives of different sets of owners with a 
firm‘s motive to internationalize. 
Finally, I did not examine the performance consequences of the growth 
strategies and how the same is conditioned by firm level governance.  While there is 
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a rich body of literature linking the domestic and foreign expansion strategies to firm 
performance, linking this relationship to firm governance could be a useful avenue to 
advance the extant literature.  Additionally, future studies could examine the 
network effects of board interlocks in a greater detail by focusing on various network 
parameters other than network centrality. 
To conclude, I believe that the theoretical framework and the findings of my 
dissertation will stimulate strategy and governance scholars, as well as practitioners, 
to examine governance issues using alternate theoretical frameworks which may be 
more relevant for a given context.  Researchers should be motivated to move away 
from the agency-centric view on corporate governance, and utilize the richness of 
local institutional context in governance studies. Policy makers should be motivated 
to institute corporate governance codes that incorporate the idiosyncrasies of the local 
institutional environment, resulting in enhanced compliance by firms, and better 
efficacy of governance codes in achieving what they are expected to achieve.  
Practitioners should be motivated to understand exactly what role board members 
fulfill and accordingly structure the boards to minimize the expectation-delivery 
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